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Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the future of the Franc Zone (FZ) and of the 
CFA franc in the event of integrated European monetary union. The year 1992 
has been set as the date for full economic integration in Europe. Certain 
conditions have yet to be met in order to achieve a European Central Bank 
with a unique currency, but nevertheless the goal is monetary unification. 
Accordingly, research should anticipate the expected impact on the EEC 
partners. 
Among those partners, there is an important subset of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which are part of a monetary co-operation system, 
the FZ, in which France guarantees the common monetary unit, the CFA franc, 
through special institutional arrangements. But France is also a member of the 
EEC so that any monetary reshaping within the EEC will ultimately affect the 
FZ and, in turn, the CFA franc. What will be the impact of a common 
European monetary authority on the structure, characteristics and rules of the 
FZ, and hence on the future of the CFA franc? Obviously this is a politically 
sensitive issue, but the events of recent months point to the necessity of 
answering these questions. 
Indeed, for the first time since 1962, the devaluation of the CFA franc has 
become a serious issue, for example, as a way out in Ivorian cocoa dealings 
and in the CFA countries' crisis in general. The question of devaluation came 
up at different meetings of the FZ governing bodies in Bangui, and more 
recently, in Paris. The signs are that 'taboo' issues no longer exist in the FZ 
and it is time to provide some tentative answers and options. 
The general objective of this study is to assess the impact of a unified 
monetary authority in Europe on the FZ and also to assess the possible options 
in relation to the current CFA monetary arrangements. The specific goal of this 
part of the research is to give an evaluation of the FZ co-operation scheme. 
However, the establishment of the FZ in the colonial period was a political 
as well as an economic undertaking. Accordingly, in order to understand the 
institution fully, Section I provides an historical account of the establishment 
of the FZ. Section II gives an evaluation of the CFA franc monetary 
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co-operation system based on the methodology of pooled reserves and gives 
an assessment of the overall UMOA membership. Section III tests whether the 
Franc Zone is an optimum currency area. 
I The history of the Franc Zone 
History and current institutional arrangements 
The FZ as it is known today is the framework for monetary co-operation 
between France and her former colonies in Western and Central Africa. This 
co-operation was institutionalized after the colonies achieved independence in 
the 1960s. Originally, the FZ was a wider area which included parts of Indo-
China and Northern Africa, but the area covered later shrank. 
The two principles which characterize a monetary system, convertibility and 
stability, apply to the FZ. According to Lelart (1986), convertibility, which is 
the true basis of the FZ monetary co-operation system, is the result of a 
political agreement, not an economic or financial one. 
This political aspect of the FZ is better understood from a historical context. 
The FZ goes as far back as the French Empire. At that time, it was conceived 
as a temporary or provisional institution linking France and her colonies in 
order to survive the economic depression of the 1930s and subsequently to 
support the war effort through exchange control. Neurrisse (1987) reports that 
the original objectives of the FZ were to harmonize the many currencies that 
existed in the different colonies spread from Indo-China to Pondichery Island, 
a former French trading post in India, to the Middle-East (Lebanon, Syria), and 
Northern Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco). 
These French colonies also comprised the SSA regions of AOF (Afrique 
Occidentale Fran§aise, or French Western Africa) and of AEF (Afrique 
Equatoriale Fran9aise, or French Central Africa). AOF includes Cote d'lvoire, 
Dahomey (now Benin), Haute-Volta (now Burkina Faso), Senegal, Niger, Mali, 
Togo, Mauritania. AEF comprises Gabon, Cameroon, Chad, Central African 
Republic, and the Congo. In addition, the French empire comprises 
Madagascar and the TOM-DOM, or the French Overseas Territories and 
Departments, which included Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, the Comoros, 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia. At one time or another, there was 
different money and later different currencies in all these colonies. Such 
plurality made transactions among colonies and between colonies and the 
metropole very difficult since there was no clear basis for exchange. That is 
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the reason why the Colonial Pact (and the Colonial Currency Act) was enacted. 
This pact was the outcome of a long process of legal dispositions and rules 
that led to the creation of the first French Company of Africa under the 
auspices of Cardinal Richelieu. 
The Colonial Pact was built on five principles. 
1. The products of the colonies could only be shipped to the metropolitan 
market; 
2. Sea transportation between colonies and the metropole and vice versa, as 
well as the link between colonies, was reserved to the French sea 
authorities; 
3. The colonial market was closed to foreign products, the metropole providing 
all necessary manufactured goods to the colonies; 
4. Colonial products had the privilege of being favourably treated on the 
metropolitan market, as guaranteed by protection rights; and 
5. Colonial products could not be manufactured in the colonies but exclusively 
in the metropolitan territory. 
At the outset, these principles constituted the bedrock of the co-operation 
scheme that followed. 
The objectives of this colonial pact were clear: to establish the colonies on 
the one hand as providers of primary products and raw materials, and on the 
other hand as consumers of manufactured goods of the metropole. To make the 
colonial pact work, some monetary organization was needed. At the start, 
monetary segregation prevailed in the metropole and in the colonies. Such 
segregation had a dual aspect. There was first the prohibition of colonial 
currency circulation in France, and of French currency in the colonies; second, 
there was the setting of an exchange rate favourable to the metropole. But very 
soon the office of exchange became overwhelmed with many currencies and 
the metropole imposed the French currency on the colonies but at different 
values according to the territories. 
The separation was later abolished, and a unit of French currency then had 
the same value in France as in the colonies. From that point on, unification of 
colonial currency and the creation of colonial banks became necessary and 
consequently colonial central banks were established. Thus the Banque de la 
Reunion, the Banque du Senegal, then later the Banque de l'Afrique de l'Ouest 
(BAO or Central Bank of West Africa), the Banque de Madagascar, the 
Banque of Indo-China, were created. This situation remained until between the 
two World Wars. 
The FZ has experienced marked evolution from the depression in 1929 and 
during World War II, and from the Union Frangaise to the Communaute 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE FRANC ZONE 5 
Frangaise in 1955, before independence in the 1960s. After the depression and 
during World War II, the exchange control of September 1939 prohibited all 
commercial and financial transactions with the rest of the world. Exchange 
controls were extended to the colonies to support the war effort. But, according 
to Xavier de la Fourniere (1971), the formation of the FZ was due not to the 
war, but to the breakdown of the gold exchange standard and the willingness 
of France to protect her colonies from the 1930 crisis by constituting a market 
isolated from the world. The Caisse Centrale de la France Libre reinforced the 
cohesion of the Zone during the war. 
After World War I, and until the end of 1955, the Communaute Frangaise 
shrank in size. Syria withdrew in 1949; in March 1949, the Djibouti franc, 
although issued by the French treasury, was detached from the Zone and 
became convertible freely into US dollars. This was done in the interest of the 
transit activities of Djibouti which was assimilated to a foreign country. 
The accord of December 1954 had left all financial competence to all the 
three states of Indo-China, each country with her own currency (Vietnamese 
piastre, the kip from Laos, and the riel from Cambodia). For the remaining 
members of the Zone, the Caisse Centrale de la France Libre became the 
Caisse Centrale of Overseas. That Caisse led to the creation of a monetary 
committee to reinforce the Zone in 1951. The monetary techniques have been 
improved and consolidated by the generalization of the operations account 
system, which was and remained a special account in the French Treasury. 
Agreements on the operations account were concluded with newly created 
Central Banks of Africa and Madagascar. Northern African protectorates have 
a special scheme of Compte d'avance. This situation remained until 
independence in the 1960s. Hence what is now known as the FZ is mostly the 
monetary co-operation between France, AOF and AEF. The Indo-Chinese 
states, Middle East states, and the Northern African states all withdrew. 
The new accord of co-operation gave to each new independent state the 
right to issue money and to create a central bank. In AOF, the central bank 
changed from BAO (Banque de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) to Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) on April 1959. 
In May 1962,1'Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) was established 
and comprises Dahomey (now Benin), C6te d'lyoire, Haute-Volta (now 
Burkina-Faso), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal. Togo joined in 1963; socialist Mali 
and Guinea (Conakry) refused to ratify the agreement and went on to create 
their own central banks, and their monetary units, the Malian franc and 
Guinean sily. In 1973, Mauritania also withdrew and created her own currency, 
the Ouguiya. Mali joined and became member of UMOA in 1984. Guinea, 
after the death of revolutionary leader Sekou Toure, negotiated with France 
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and the monetary unit changed from the Sily to the Guinean Franc linked to 
the French Franc (FF). 
In Central Africa, the scheme is similar. Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo, Chad, and Gabon also had a common central bank, the 
Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC). They did not form a 
monetary union as in West Africa; rather they grouped into a custom union 
called PUnion Douaniere des Etats de 1'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC). Equatorial 
Guinea, a former Spanish colony, joined UDEAC and BEAC later. In BEAC 
Zone countries, each CFA bank note bears the name of each individual 
country. Besides these countries of Western and Central Africa, the other 
members of the FZ are the Comoros and the TOM-DOM. 
The BCEAO and BEAC performed the usual functions of a central bank, 
issuing a common currency, the CFA Franc (CFAF). 
Current institutional arrangements of the Franc Zone 
The current members of the FZ comprise the two main parts of the zone and 
are in Sub-Saharan Africa: in UMOA and BEAC. 
Four principles govern the functioning of the Zone: 
1. The fixed parity between the FF and the CFAF since 1948 (1 FF = 50 
CFAF), and such parity has never changed; 
2. Free transferability without limit among member countries; 
3. Pooled reserves — the Zone uses a common foreign exchange policy 
against the rest of the world; and 
4. Full convertibility of CFAF to FF through the special and famous 
operations account opened at the French Treasury (not at the Banque de 
France) for BCEAO and BEAC. The operations account holds the foreign 
exchange reserves of all members of the Zone. 
From an economic viewpoint, these principles have important implications. 
First, the Banque de France is the lender of last resort of the whole financial 
system of FZ member countries. Second, the French Treasury can in theory 
grant unlimited deficit to the operations account. Third, the Banque de France 
and the French Treasury are actually the two institutions that hold effective 
monetary sovereignty over the FZ as a whole, the member states being in fact 
deprived of such power. Finally, although the French Treasury holds monetary 
sovereignty in the CFA countries, their operations account balances are 
deposited into the French Treasury account at the Banque de France. 
Consequently, the Banque de France plays a central role in .the CFA system. 
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All CFA countries' foreign exchange transactions take place through the 
Banque de France. In addition, with the recent Maastricht Treaty signed in 
December 1991, constraints have been put on national budgets. Hence, the 
French Treasury can no longer monetize its deficits that previously allowed 
overdrafts to occur on the operations account without the consent of the new 
European Central Bank. 
The above features distinguish the FZ monetary union countries from all 
others. The nominal exchange rate is exogenous and does not constitute a 
policy instrument. This leads to the financing of balance-of-payments 
imbalances unique to the Zone because of the French guarantee. But countries 
in the Zone confront certain restrictions on fiscal and monetary policy we will 
discuss later. The change of parity between FF and CFAF can occur only by 
unanimous agreement of member countries and France. 
Convertibility, which contributes a key feature of the FZ, is a complex 
concept which implies freedom and guarantee. The Bretton-Woods accords 
asked member countries to abolish all restrictions on the use of their currency. 
Indeed, a currency is convertible if it can be used freely; this is the private 
sector convertibility ensured by the market mechanism of supply and demand 
(Article VIII, Section 2.a). 
Right from the start, convertibility in the FZ was conceived differently 
through the operations account in Paris with the French Treasury. The 
operations account actually constitutes the key element of the FZ system. It is 
so important that it is supported by two specific pieces of legislation: 
• The Agreement of 13 March 1973 between France and the BEAC; 
• The Convention or Agreement of 4 December 1973 between France and 
UMOA countries. 
According to these agreements, a current account is opened at the French 
Treasury for BCEAO and BEAC. The operations account records in its credits 
or liabilities, the receipts in foreign currencies that each one of the central 
banks can acquire outside the issuing zone. On the assets side, the expenditures 
of each central bank outside the zone are recorded. Bernard Vinay (1988) best 
describes the operations account mechanism. Such mechanism includes the 
exchange rates transaction at the Paris exchange market. Since this affects the 
exchange opportunity costs, it is important to examine it in detail. 
Suppose an Ivorian is an exporter of agricultural products, say cocoa. Let's 
call our exporting firm Cocoa-Export Limited (CEL). The process begins with 
a loan that CEL receives at its local bank in Cote d'lvoire or any other country 
within the FZ. CEL will finance its marketing of cocoa with the loan. After 
purchasing the cocoa from the producers at the guaranteed price per 
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kilogramme, CEL exports the cocoa to a client residing in, for example, the 
United States. 
But how does the operations account really work? The American client 
settles his bills by transferring the adequate amount in US dollars to CEL's 
bank in Cote d'lvoire. But CEL needs CFAF, not US dollars, to pay back ihe 
loan and to run the daily business. CEL therefore requests its bank to negotiate 
the US dollars and to deliver the equivalent in CFAF in exchange. Under an 
independent central bank setting, the central bank will sell the US dollars at 
the market exchange rate. 
In the FZ, CEL's bank places an order to its correspondent in Paris to 
negotiate the transaction. It is CEL's correspondent bank in Paris that actually 
sells the US dollars at the Paris exchange market. Similarly, at the Paris 
exchange market, other banks will buy dollars by order of local importers of, 
say, American goods. 
The correspondent bank in Paris sells the dollars for FFs (not CFAF 
directly). The equivalent amount in FF is transferred to the BCEAO (or 
BEAC). 
The correspondent bank in Paris puts an order to the central bank (BCEAO 
or BEAC) to give the value in CFAF to the local bank in Cote d'lvoire, which 
in turn will finally pay CEL. But the central bank (BCEAO or BEAC) does 
not directly transfer the equivalent amount of FF into CFAF to the local bank. 
There exists one additional step. The BCEAO (or BEAC) will deposit the 
amount in FF into the correspondent operations account at the French Treasury 
and at the same time deliver to CEL's local bank the equivalent in CFAF. 
The foreign exchange transactions appear as a sale of foreign currencies at 
the Paris foreign exchange market by a resident of Franc Zone countries, 
through his local bank correspondent, to foreign currency buyers through their 
respective banks. Hence, by this mechanism, there occurs a selling and buying 
of foreign currencies on a daily basis by African economic agents of the Franc 
Zone. 
When the sale of foreign currencies at the Paris foreign exchange market 
is greater than their purchase, the surplus is converted into FF that will be 
deposited into the operations account. Conversely, when the purchase of 
foreign currencies by FZ residents is greater than their sale, the difference is 
paid for by drawing from the operations account of the concerned central bank, 
BCEAO or BEAC. 
When a member country's foreign exchange reserves are depleted and no 
longer able to cover external transactions, then the French Treasury advances 
the amount needed and the operations account is in overdraft. One should add, 
however, that movements in the operations account are not due solely to the 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE FRANC ZONE 9 
external foreign exchange transactions. The operations account transactions 
include also the ones conducted by all other FZ members. 
The process of an African importer of the FZ is just the reverse of the 
export process. However, the situation becomes more complicated when the 
operations account is in overdraft and the importer of the FZ countries requires 
foreign exchange to finance an import operation from outside the FZ. In such 
a case, the process is as follows: the importer applies for a loan from a local 
commercial bank that puts up the CFAF equivalent of the foreign exchange 
required. Upon approval by the country's Ministry of Finance, the commercial 
bank makes an official request to the central bank (BCEAO or BEAC) to 
purchase first FFs which are then converted into the required foreign currency 
on the Paris foreign exchange. 
The Banque de France (the French central bank) is responsible for making 
the conversion when an African central bank (BCEAO or BEAC) operations 
account with the French treasury is in deficit. The Banque de France then sells 
the FFs on the Paris foreign exchange market and purchases the requisite 
amount of foreign exchange, which is deposited in the Foreign Exchange 
Stabilization Fund. This Fund is responsible for providing the necessary 
foreign exchange, and the concerned African central bank's (BCEAO or 
BEAC) operations account is debited accordingly. This will obviously increase 
the overdraft position. 
The African central bank concerned is required to pay an automatic 
overdraft charge on its operations account with the French Treasury. The 
conversion operation is undertaken within the zones by commercial banks 
between CFAF and FF without commission at fixed parity. However, FZ 
convertibility resembles an official convertibility according to Article VIII of 
the Bretton-Woods accords. But this is not the case as the CFAF are not 
bought by a central bank, but by the French Treasury. 
Hence the CFAF are converted to FF not ex post, that is resulting from the 
demand of foreign banks. The CFAF are converted ex ante and the acquired 
FF are the monetary units that the members will use to make transfers to the 
outside world. FZ convertibility is not quantitatively restrained. The BCEAO 
and BEAC convert their currency according to their needs. FZ convertibility 
is therefore of a different nature from the Bretton-Woods accords. It is not of 
an economic nature by way of market-clearing exchange rate. Such 
convertibility has essentially political underpinnings since it involves different 
independent countries willing to co-operate beyond commercial and financial 
flows, mostly on political grounds. All the treaties, agreements, and 
conventions ratified by member countries reveal the share of political power 
in the management of the zone. 
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The structure of the FZ is organized as follows. In UMOA, the highest 
authority is the conference of Heads of States, instituted with the 1973 
reforms. The council of ministers defines the monetary policy of the Union. 
The Board of Directors of BCEAO is composed of two administrators selecied 
by each government and by France. This Board presides over the National 
Credit Committee whose objectives are to decentralize monetary policy 
formulation in the countries concerned. The structure of the BEAC in Central 
Africa is similar. There is a Monetary Committee whose members are the 
Ministers of Finance, and a Board of Directors which comprises three 
representatives of France. In the event of an overdraft, there is a whole series 
of measures with which member countries must comply to ensure that 5he 
balance of the consolidated operations account will not be negative. Among 
these safeguards is the 20% level of assets signal. When the total pooled 
reserves level is near 20%, the two African central banks are requested to 
exhaust all other avenues of foreign exchange before going to the French 
Treasury. In fact, since the 1973 reforms, 65% of the African central bank 
reserves are in FF deposited in the operations account, and 35% are in other 
hard currencies deposited elsewhere. 
Furthermore, when the operations account has been in deficit for 30 
consecutive days, the ceiling of the rediscount rate is cut by 20%; the central 
bank concerned can no longer grant medium-term credit and the Board of 
Directors is immediately called upon to take appropriate measures required by 
the circumstances. Thus in the event of an overdraft, the African central banks 
are required to sell their foreign exchange and transfer the FF received into the 
French Treasury. A positive operations account thus represents an advantage 
for the French Treasury, whose assets in FF increase. 
The French Treasury pays interest on a positive operations account balance. 
The interest rate is an average of the Banque de France intervention rate 
during the current quarter. In contrast, when there is an overdraft, the Banque 
de France receives payment from the debtor African central bank as has been 
the case for BCEAO since 1980. The Banque de France receives 1% interest 
on zero to 5 million FF, 2% on 5 to 10 million; and on an overdraft of more 
than 10 million the interest paid is the same as that received for a positive 
balance. 
It should be noted that the French Treasury does not open an operations 
account for each individual country but to the Common central bank, one for 
BCEAO, and another for BEAC. However, each country maintains a separate 
account with the central bank where 65% of its official reserves are held at the 
operations account. 
Hence, Benin's net balance can be compensated by Cote d'lvoire, and 
Chad's by Gabon. Such compensation is an example of solidarity between 
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members, but it does make it difficult to monitor the monetary situation 
regularly on a country-by-country basis. Hence, if one country has drawn fully 
on its own pooled and unpooled reserves, it can use those of another country. 
The French Treasury steps in when the operation account of the Union as a 
whole has been fully drawn down. 
The French guarantee makes the CFAF a convertible currency. There is 
only one zone, but two currencies: the Franc de la Communaute Financiere 
Africaine of BCEAO, and the Franc de la Cooperation Financiere en Afrique 
Centrale issued by BEAC. But their parity vis a vis the FF has remained the 
same since 1948 and the two CFAFs have had the same value since 1945. 
Advantages of the Franc Zone 
The FZ system provides four types of advantage to its members: 
® The guarantee provided by France allows easy capital inflows into the FZ 
countries; 
• The rigorous monetary policy puts a limit on excessive inflationary 
tensions; 
9 The credibility of the CFAF, through the FF, allows FZ countries greater 
borrowing capacity outside the Zone, given that they can obtain capital 
abroad beyond their own net foreign assets; 
9 Not only did the FZ allow its members to avoid the monetary 
'balkanization' prevailing in Anglophone Africa after independence, but it 
was instrumental in the promotion of trade among the member countries. 
Disadvantages of the Franc Zone 
The FZ is not without problems however. According to its critics Diarra 
(1972), Tchundjang (1981) and Martin (1986), among others, the FZ monetary 
system lends itself to a spirit of laxity and it contributes to the domination and 
extroversion of the economies of member countries. These countries, according 
to critics, are at the mercy of any FF devaluation. 
The development of I'esprit de facilite 
The monetary guarantee creates an attitude of 'taking it easy' in certain 
countries. As Diarra (1972) from Senegal, one of the main critics of the FZ, 
once observed: 
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The monetary co-operation, in which some member states are taking it 
too easily, does have its drawbacks: to favour a behaviour of laziness 
non-compatible with real economic development. 
The over-use of fiscal policy is derived from such an attitude. Foreign 
investment is attracted by a very flexible and accommodating fiscal regime, 
reinforced by an accommodating investment code. 
The domination and extroversion of the economies of 
member states 
According to Tchundjang, the CFAF is fundamentally a currency of a colonial 
nature. For him and other critics: 
8 Fixity of parity does not necessarily imply stability of the economy. Any 
fluctuation of the FF is transmitted to the CFAF; 
9 The FZ system directs investment towards products and activities needed 
most in the metropolitan country. It does not allow the monetary authority 
to allocate credit to productive sectors; and 
9 In the FZ system, enterprises do not re-invest; all profits are repatriated, 
escaping taxation. This is a way of deviating savings to France. Capital 
outflows therefore exceed capital inflows, creating an imbalance in the 
balance of payments. 
The impact of French franc devaluation 
Since.the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, the 
FF experienced three devaluations, 3% in October 1981, 5% in June 1982, and 
2.5% in March 1983. In addition, in 1974, the FF exited the 'snake'. This 
made the FF a floating currency. Vis ci vis other currencies, the CFAF also 
changes values each time the FF does. Naturally, successive devaluations 
affected the member states' economies. On a commercial level, devaluations 
make bills in dollars (especially for oil and oil products) very heavy, in 
addition to making imports outside France very expensive. This could lead to 
a revision of financing from projects which include equipment imported from 
outside the FZ. However, this also affects the export of local products to these 
countries. This is becoming more and more important since foreign trade with 
France is continuously declining (M'bet, 1990). On a financial level, 
devaluation depreciates the net foreign assets in the operations account. With 
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respect to debt, devaluation leads to an increase in the debt services evaluated 
in foreign currencies. Since about 80% of LDC debt is in dollars, devaluation 
accounts for 60-70% of the foreign debt of FZ countries. When inflation is 
imported, it is accelerated by the time-lag effect. There is a delay between the 
time the FF devaluation is decided and the real effects of such an operation. 
Some firms in member countries increase their prices as soon as the 
devaluation decision is known. They increase their prices again when the costs 
related to devaluation are actually in effect. But all of these intertwined 
relationships may be greatly affected by the recent developments in the 
European move towards economic integration. It is therefore important to 
review how far and how fast the European integration is proceeding. 
European monetary integration 
The European Community seems to be moving rapidly towards economic 
integration. There is renewed interest in European monetary integration and the 
necessary monetary reforms to achieve it. To that end, the European Council 
established the Delors Committee 'to study and propose concrete stages for 
progress towards economic and monetary union'. In April 1989, the Delors 
Committee submitted its report to the European Community's Council of 
Finance Ministers and proposed a three-stage process for achieving economic 
and monetary union. Stage one of monetary union started on 1 July 1990 with 
full liberalization of capital within the EEC. All Community currencies entered 
the EMS exchange rate mechanism. Negotiation was to start on a new treaty 
to replace the 1974 Council decision that defined the mandate of the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors. Stage two can begin only when the 
new treaty has come into force. That will probably occur in 1996 with a 
gradual transfer of the decision-making process regarding monetary issues to 
a new ESCB that would absorb the previous monetary institutions. Stage two 
is a period of transition and training. The final stage would start with a move 
to irrevocably locked exchange rates and allocation of full monetary and 
economic competencies to Community institutions, by 1999. 
Rules governing co-ordination in the macroeconomic and budgetary policy 
spheres would become binding. During the final stage, the national currencies 
would be replaced by a single community currency. The European currency 
unit (ECU) has the potential to be developed into such a unique currency. This 
would imply that the ECU would be transformed from a basket of currencies 
into a genuine currency. But, as Lancaster (1989) pointed out, many details of 
the changes needed to achieve the goals of the single European Act are 
unclear. 
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In order to understand the monetary unification process in Europe more 
clearly, and to draw some eventual implications for the evolution of the FZ, 
this section briefly reviews developments in the European Monetary System 
(EMS). 
History of the EMS 
The EMS was formed by a resolution of the European Council and came into 
operation in March 1979. It had two major aims: 
9 To restore exchange rate stability between European currencies; 
• To create external stability among member countries in terms of prices and 
costs and a harmonization of economic policy. 
Main features of the EMS 
The most important feature of the EMS is a system of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates. A second feature concerns the central role of the ECU, the 
mechanism for detecting the divergence and the move towards the 
institutionalization of the EMS. The divergence indicator shows the movement 
of the exchange rate of each EMS currency against the weighted average 
movement of the other EMS currencies. The ECU is issued by the European 
Fund for Monetary Co-operation as a counterpart for depositing 20% of assets 
in gold and 20% in dollars held by the EMS central banks. The ECU is 
designed to serve four functions: a numeraire for the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism; a basis for the indicator divergence; a numeraire for central bank 
financial operations; and a means of settlement between monetary authorities 
in the Community. As an exchange rate mechanism, the EMS is based on the 
existence of bilateral parities or central rates between currencies. These central 
rates determine a grid of bilateral central rates around which fluctuation 
margins of plus or minus 2.25% have been established (6% for Italian lira). 
The achievements of the EMS 
The achievements of the EMS are primarily two-fold. The variability of 
exchange rates and the competitive conditions among the participants have 
been narrowed significantly. The system has proved increasingly capable of 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE FRANC ZONE 15 
developing joint decision-making on both the defence of existing central rates 
and their modification in realignments. 
Two critical observations concerning the EMS have been that it imposes 
intervention and adjustment burdens primarily on the weaker currencies, and 
that growth in the participating countries has been disappointing. There are 
asymmetries within the EMS with respect to monetary autonomy, but these 
features can be viewed as a necessary element in a system aiming to create a 
zone of monetary stability. The EMS countries have had a disappointing record 
of output and employment growth during the 1980s, particularly since 1986. 
Fiscal policy may have been marked by excessive inertia but it seems difficult 
to attribute any specific responsibility for a deflationary bias, to the EMS itself, 
given the high levels of public debt and the large public sector deficits existing 
in some EMS countries. 
Evolution of the EMS towards a European monetary union 
At the outset, the operation of the EMS was characterized by two elements: it 
was flexible, and it was run efficiently by the participating central banks. This 
high degree of flexibility can be explained by many factors. First, the EMS is 
primarily a political institution, not simply a technical one. The technical 
means are used to achieve political objectives. Second, the flexibility was 
necessary because of varying institutional solutions to many common problems 
among the participating central banks; it is workable because the committee 
of EC central bank governors meets regularly. Hence, despite persisting 
problems, such as the strength of German monetary policy, there has been 
slow but continuous progress towards unification. 
The unexpected success of the ECU as a unit in private financial markets 
has opened new opportunities. The private use of the ECU has taken on an 
important existence of its own, so much so that a wider range of financial 
instruments is now available in ECU than in some component national 
currencies. 
Such use may well develop further even without the three official steps that 
are often cited as preconditions: (1) a strengthening of ECU to make it more 
than just a composite currency but a unit close in quality to the strongest EMS 
currencies; (2) a linkage of the private and official unit, through the 
intermediary of the Bank of International Settlements; (3) the arrangement of 
a lender-of-last-resort function to assure emergency liquidity assistance to 
banks active in ECU. 
Despite these considerable longer-term opportunities for development of 
private use of the unit, two basic conclusions remain valid in a longer-run 
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prospective. First, the ECU is constrained in its evolution because it is an 
average of eleven currencies, and cannot be expected to make major headway 
as a parallel currency in the countries of the strong EMS currencies. Second, 
growth in the usage and the issue of the ECU is neither a sufficient nor an 
obviously necessary condition for arriving at an advanced stage of monetary 
integration. To measure the success of the latter primarily with reference to 
such indicators would be misleading. 
Amidst the debate of the move towards monetary union, the Delors 
Committee described the features of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) in which the ECU has an important role. If an ESCB were to follow 
the earlier proposed Delors report scheme, national central banks would 
prevail. In such a case, national currencies would still exist, and the CFAF 
would live on, subject to plausible amendments of the conventions. But 
ultimately, the goal of the EEC is monetary unification with one central bank 
and one currency. Consequently, the FZ will be profoundly reorganized. The 
degree of such an upheaval of the FZ will depend on the gains and costs 
associated with the Zone. Therefore an evaluation of the CFA system is 
necessary. 
II A new evaluation of the CFA monetary 
co-operation system 
The 13 SSA countries of the FZ have received considerable attention over the 
past few years. Recent discussions on the Franc Zone have focused on three 
issues: the comparative growth performance of CFA versus non-CFA countries, 
competitiveness, and the mechanism of bank restructuring. 
Some authors performed meticulous calculations to show that prior to the 
1980s, CFA countries either maintained or improved their economic situation 
vis a vis non-CFA countries (Devarajan and de Melo, 1987; Guillaumont, 
1984). Other authors claimed that CFA countries performed poorly because FZ 
rules reduce the need for time adjustment. Other authors found, on the 
contrary, that African countries, CFA and non-CFA alike, were affected 
negatively because they pay more for their imports. Medhora (1990a) however, 
found that in UMOA CFA countries: 
... nominal exchange rate variability has not measurably hurt the 
imports of the Union. In this regard, membership in the Union has not 
imposed a measurable cost on the countries. 
Whatever the case, in most SSA countries some kind of stabilization policy or 
adjustment programme has been called for to reverse the imbalances between 
domestic supply and demand. Such disequilibrium is reflected in a growing 
external deficit, inflationary pressures, slow or negative growth in per capita 
income, debt crises, financial crises, declining competitiveness. 
In this section, we carry out an assessment of the CFA countries' economies 
through an analysis of the fluctuations in the operations accounts. In order to 
do so, we present first an overview of the overall economic stance of CFA 
countries in the last decade. 
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The recent economic situation of the CFA countries 
Economic structure and situation of UMOA Zone countries 
The economic hardships that UMOA countries are going through is well 
documented. The seven countries differ in many ways, in size and population, 
as well as in geographical location, even within the same region. Table I 
shows some of these features and some macroeconomic indicators. 





d'lvoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo 
Area ('000 sq km) 113 274 323 1240 1267 196 57 
Population (1989) m 4.60 8.7 12.10 7.25 7.25 6.9 3.36 
Life expectancy (1986) years 50 47 52 47 44 47 53 
GDP at market prices 534 517 3038 578 730 1476 406.6 
CFA (1988) bn (2847)* 
Real GDP growth (1988) % 1.8 5.6 -1.0 -0.8 7.5 4.8 4.7 
(9.9)* (449.2)* 
Consumer price 4.3 4.2 8.2 2.6 -1.4 -1.8 -0.1 
inflation (1988) % (0.7)* (6.0)* (2.7)* (3.0)* (-1.0)' 
Current account -170 -83.9 -1281 -92 -94.3 -2.68 -62.4 
(1988) $ m (-761)* (-86)* (-46.4)* 
Total external debt ($ m) 1055 866 14125 2067 1742 3617 1210 
External debt service 23.9 10.4 39.9 20.1 49.8 30.2 26.8 
ratio % (12.0)* 
M1/GDP % (1987) 12.24 16.91 19.59 18.56 11.25 15.11 24.62 
M2/GDP % (1987) 19.17 23.65 30.44 22.06 17.60 23.45 44.31 
RSV/GDP % (1987) 0.7.1 59.52 0.29 2.68 38.23 0.64 95.99 
Export fob ($ m) 189 248.7 2354 252 369 755 325 
Imports cif ($ m) 439 587.5 1907 359 373 1189 352 
Source: Statistiques Economiques et Financieres de la BCEAO-IFS. Various issues 
Note: * 1989 estimates. 
It appears from Table 1 that Mali and Niger are the two largest countries in 
terms of surface area. Niger, the largest country, is about 22 times the size of 
Togo, and about 4 times that of Cote d'lvoire. The population density in Togo 
is about twice that of Cote d'lvoire. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso are landlocked 
countries in the Sahel; whereas Cote d'lvoire, Benin, Togo and Senegal are 
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open to the Atlantic Ocean. The Ivorian GDP at market prices of 1988 is about 
seven times that of Togo. 
The real GDP growth rate of 1988 has been negative for Cote d'lvoire and 
Mali. Niger and Burkina Faso have experienced the highest GDP growth rate 
in 1988 at 7.5% and 5.6% respectively; followed by Senegal (4.8%) and Togo 
(4.7%) With its negative growth rate, Cote d'lvoire experienced the highest 
consumer inflation at 8.2%. 
All of the seven countries have deficit current account with Cote d'lvoire 
on the top with 1281 million US dollars in 1988. But it is Niger which holds 
the highest external debt service ratio (49.8), followed by Cote d'lvoire and 
Senegal. 
Exports of UMOA countries are essentially primary products or 
semi-processed primary products such as vegetable oils, cotton fabrics, 
plywood, fertilizers. Whatever the composition, the origins of GDP are 
significantly different between countries. Similarly, the main destinations of 
exports and origins of imports do not follow a common pattern. The salient 
feature in all of the figures is the dominance of agriculture in the origins of 
GDP. The primary sector accounts for about 30% in GDP. This feature alone 
describes the heavy dependence on agriculture and of the vulnerability of the 
economies. Industry lags behind services in GDP. But services constitute the 
single most important item in the current account that creates the deficit in the 
balance of trade. The service sector is be an avenue for further research 
especially after the almost certain failure of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Tariff talks. 
Benin's agriculture represents 43.5% of GDP, whereas manufacturing 
accounts for 4.4%. Services on the land constitute a high share of 34.3% of 
GDP. The service sector deserves further investigation to reinforce its role in 
the economy. Benin's main exports are cotton lint and cocoa: a typical primary 
export-led developing economy. Industry products constitute the bulk of 
Benin's imports. More interesting are the export destinations. Indeed, despite 
what one might have believed, Benin's major export outlets do not include 
France. The USA has, in recent years, constituted the major market, followed 
by Portugal. Benin does, however, export 9.4% of her products to Togo, a FZ 
member. Nonetheless, Benin imports mostly from France (21.3%), Thailand 
(11.7%), Italy, and the Netherlands. 
For Burkina Faso, the origins and composition of GDP are very similar in 
pattern to Benin, with agriculture representing the greatest proportion of GDP 
(36.8%), followed by services (35.4%). Burkina-Faso exports mainly cotton 
and gold, and imports industrial products. France accounts for the lion's share 
of both export destinations and import origins. Thus, 34.4% of Burkina Faso's 
exports go to France, and 16.2% to Cote d'lvoire. It imports mostly from 
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France (31.2%), Cote d'lvoire (16.3%) and the USA (16.4%). Within the FZ, 
foreign trade is presently limited to Benin. 
Cote d'lvoire represents the case of a relatively diversified economy, but 
one still based on agriculture. The primary sector accounts for 34% of GDP. 
The tertiary sector dominates agriculture in GDP (46.9%). 
The trade balance is positive. Coffee (Cote d'lvoire is the third largest 
world producer) and cocoa (the world largest producer) represent the two 
dominant exports of the country. Along with timber, they constitute the major 
source of foreign exchange earnings. No wonder Cote d'lvoire has a strong 
positive correlation between traditional exports and the overall position of the 
economy. Any drop in the price of these products reduces foreign earnings 
which in turn affects other macro-data, such as the operation accounts. 
Given the high share of services in GDP, closer examination in the light of 
the apparent deadlock of the Uruguay Round on services is required. Cote 
d'lvoire's export outlets are quite diversified, The Netherlands (16.9%), France 
(14.8%), USA and Italy (about 7.5%). France remains the main supplier to the 
Ivorian economy, as the country imports about 31% from the former colonial 
power. 
Overall, Cote d'lvoire's unsustained growth in the 1980s, that ended the 
'success story', seems to have derived from the heavy dependence on 
agriculture exports. Exports account for 56% of GDP, and traditional exports 
account for about 55.6% of total exports (M'Bet, 1990). The drops in exports 
prices resulted in an unprecedented adverse balance of merchandise trade in 
the 1980s. This led to the rise of foreign borrowing to finance the economy, 
hence the rise in the debt service ratio. This is the case of an export-orientated 
economy which cannot adapt quickly to a largely exogenous crisis. This has 
been the main danger to countries whose economies are based on commodity 
exports for which demand is relatively inelastic. 
Mali is a case where a trade balance deficit does occur. The primary sector 
dominates both in GDP and exports. Mali's imports come from FZ countries 
whereas its export outlets are more diversified. Cote d'lvoire and France are 
Mali's main suppliers; whereas Algeria is the main importer of Malian 
products, followed by France. 
For Niger, besides the primary sector which accounts for 39.1% of GDP, 
the secondary sector occupies a relatively high share of GDP at 37.6%. This 
is mostly due to the uranium mining sector. France and Cote d'lvoire represent 
the major suppliers, 32.3% and 9.4% respectively. Most of the country's 
uranium is exported to France. So the FZ is the prominent market for Niger. 
Senegal is both a coastal and a Sahelian country. Services dominate GDP 
at 48.8%, followed by industry at 29%, and agriculture stands at 22.2%. Fish 
and fish products constitute the major exports along with groundnut products. 
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Senegal is an export-orientated monoculture economy, whose major trading 
partner is France. 
Togo's foreign trade generated a deficit in 1988. Agriculture represented 
34.4% of GDP followed by the service industry at 22.5%. The major exports 
are phosphates and primary agricultural products like cotton, coffee and cocoa 
beans. The main export destination is France (12.2%). Hence, Togo's foreign 
markets are quite outside the FZ. But France remains the prominent supplier 
at 24.8%; followed by the Netherlands (9.9%), Thailand (9.1%) and Taiwan 
(6.9%). 
The most salient feature is that for imports, France remains the major 
trading partner for all of the seven countries. Export destinations are more 
varied overall. 
Overall, Cote d'lvoire remained the only country with a trade balance 
surplus in 1988 of US$447 million. On monetary aggregates, Togo's share of 
broad money (M2) out of GDP is the highest at 44.31%, followed by Cote 
d'lvoire (30.44%) and Burkina-Faso and Senegal (24%). 
With respect to the total foreign reserves share out of GDP, Togo held a 
disproportionately high share of 95.95% in 1988; followed by Burkina Faso 
59.52%, then Niger 38.23%. The 'big countries', Cote d'lvoire and Senegal, 
had a very small share of 0.29% and 0.64% respectively. 
The share of total reserves in GDP shows a reversal in trend. Cote d'lvoire 
and Senegal used to have the largest percentage share up to 1978. Smaller 
landlocked countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Togo on the coast 
hold the largest share. Togo holds the biggest share overall, followed by 
Burkina Faso and Niger. These trends are presented in Table 2. 
Economic structure and situation of BEAC Zone countries 
The six countries making up the BEAC Zone are as varied as those in UMOA. 
Chad, the largest country in terms of surface area, is 2.7 times the size of 
Cameroon. Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), which is the second 
largest country, are landlocked, whereas Congo, Cameroon and Equatorial 
Guinea are open to the Atlantic Ocean. Congo, Cameroon and Gabon are oil 
exporters, the only ones so far in the CFA Zone. With respect to population, 
Cameroon is the largest country with 10 million inhabitants, twice as many as 
Chad and five times that of CAR. Cameroon's real GDP at market prices in 
1988 was about 11 times that of CAR, and four times that of Gabon. 
Table 2 Percent share of total foreign reserves in GDP in UMOA 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo 
1966 15.96971 23.14026 24.18605 0.640000 2.202388 22.31453 35.04145 
1967 13.00813 25.10232 25.78890 1.564945 0.671961 18.10219 39.10497 
1968 15.17451 31.07570 24.71669 0.747198 1.701323 7.366483 42.57095 
1969 i 0.68376 31.38686 20.21335 1.320528 4.118009 2.862419 37.76565 
1970 20.58433 43.48866 28.60583 0.959488 10.41203 9.204498 48.20918 
1971 32.66932 48.86106 20.31584 2.046783 17.59162 11.85275 50.70105 
1972 33.64929 49.27386 18.48241 3.197926 22.06197 14.07164 42.09434 
1973 36.05664 62.97786 15.62186 3.544304 24.08725 4.347827 41.93406 
1974 31.74312 69.95816 8.890392 4.987735 18.42105 1.859504 41.72089 
1975 12.66892 57.51880 12.31875 2.510460 22.37544 7.652559 32.11224 
1976 14.09692 6.30351 6.858169 3.259329 32.42925 5.486610 48.86922 
1977 13.56383 30.59336 12.00546 2.219482 31.86259 6.968569 27.31042 
1978 9.059030 16.44767 25.12619 3.151422 32.04296 3.800283 37.03704 
1979 6.896552 25.06102 7.559007 1.874414 29.35146 3.282351 30.78008 
1980 3.342964 25.32492 0.916322 4.212667 23.48005 1.290631 32.59135 
1981 20.11876 22.20132 0.776750 4.692557 17.85048 1.298895 58.72093 
1982 1.441177 17.24330 0.088478 4.137760 4.586303 1.350231 62.18020 
1983 0.990894 22.31557 0.788726 3.938731 7.854718 1.298563 61.42909 
1984 0.599233 27.22151 0.188943 5.652643 13.89629 0.364353 69.38567 
1985 0.889371 29.06856 0.149777 4.736842 21.08191 0.442708 94.18864 
1986 0.797872 45.98267 0.604192 4.291766 29.40628 0.725701 95.54854 
1987 0.712871 59.52514 0.291373 2.683424 38.23665 0.648344 95.99675 
Sources: Computed by the authors; data from IFS and Statistiques Economiques et Financieres de la BCEAO. 
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Real GDP growth rate was positive except for Cameroon (-8.6) as shown in 
Table 3. War-torn Chad had the highest growth rate in 1988 at 14.3% and that 
country also experienced the highest inflation rate at 12.8%, whereas CAR 
experienced deflation. 
Table 3 General indicators for BEAC countries (1988) 
Features Cameroon Congo Gabon CAR Chad 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Area ('000 sq km) 475 342 268 623 1284 
Population (m) 10.5 1.89 1.09 2.7 5.1 0.40 
Life expectancy (1986) 56 58 52 50 45 44 
(years) 
GDP at market prices 3768 643 981 333 273 43.7 
CFA bn (3560)* (1112)* 
Total GDP growth rate % -8.6 1.4 1.9 1.9 14.3 1.8 
Consumer price inflation % 2.0 3.6 0.3 -4.0 12.8 2.4 
Current account ($m) -880 -328 -615 -40.0 -25.5** -2.7 
Total external debt ($ m) 4229 4763 2663 673 346 199.9 
Debt service ratio % 30.9 79.3 8.7 12.8 4.0 35.0 
M1/GDP % (1987) 9.59 15.82 12.66 16.54 24.07 
RSV/GDP % (1987) 1.58 0.52 1.14 29.88 17.77 
Source: Statistiques Economiques et Monetaires de la BEAC-IFS, various issues. 
Note: * 1989 estimates. ** 1987 estimates. 
All six countries have current account deficits, although the level varies from 
country to country. Cameroon has the largest deficit in the current account, 
followed by Gabon. External debt service ratio is heaviest for Congo at 79.3%, 
followed by Equatorial Guinea with 35%, and by Cameroon with 30.9%. 
Gabon has the smallest debt service ratio at 8.7%. 
On monetary aggregates level, Chad carries the largest share of narrow 
money in GDP at 24.07%, followed by CAR, the two landlocked countries. 
The coastal countries carry smaller shares. The same tendency is observed for 
the share of foreign reserves in GDP. Congo and Cameroon, the coastal and 
oil producers, have the smallest share at 0.52% and 1.58% respectively, 
whereas CAR stands at 29.88%. 
24 RESEARCH PAPER 19 
In addition to this different behaviour, what is the composition of GDP in 
BEAC countries? What are the origins of GDP? What is the geographical 
orientation of foreign trade? 
Cameroonian GDP generates mostly from services at 43.6%. Industry 
occupies a fairly large share at 30%, followed by agriculture at 26.4%. In 1988 
Cameroon experienced a trade balance deficit despite the export of crude oil, 
the most important exported product with US$862 million in 1988. Coffee and 
cocoa constitute the other two main exports. The principal exports clearly 
indicate how vulnerable the country will be to world market price fluctuations. 
Cameroon imports not only industrial products, but a relatively high level of 
food and agricultural products. Foreign trade is mostly directed at France and 
other EEC countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. However export destinations are more varied than imports origin 
(40.1% from France). 
For Congo, the origin of GDP indicates a very high share of the tradables 
sector, which includes agricultural products. Petroleum alone represents 19.4% 
of GDP. Trade balance is also in deficit, despite the export of crude petroleum 
and timber. Congo's foreign trade is directed towards France overall. Again 
here export destination is more diversified, with the USA taking over from 
France as the main market (mostly for petroleum). Other EEC countries 
follow. However, France is the main supplier of Congo with 47% of total 
imports. 
In Gabon, services and petroleum and natural gas constitute the most 
important sources of GDP with 40.1% and 31.1% respectively in 1988. 
Petroleum represents by far the largest exported product (at $1,132 million) 
followed by other raw materials, manganese, timber and uranium. Gabon is the 
ease where France is clearly the main trading partner, both in exports and in 
imports. Gabon enjoys a trade balance surplus. 
The Central African Republic's GDP components indicate a trade balance 
deficit. Agriculture and services represent the most important source of GDP 
at 44% each. Exports consisting of diamonds and coffee are directed towards 
the EEC with Belgium receiving 42.3%, followed by industrial and food stuffs 
from France mainly (52.4%). 
Chad has a less diversified economy consisting mainly of cotton and 
livestock. Trade balance is in deficit. Export destinations are more diversified 
than import origins where France supplies 30% of most of the industrial and 
consumer goods imported. 
Equatorial Guinea is a case where France, which guarantees the currency, 
does not figure in the main export destinations. Spain, the former colonial 
power, takes up most of the trade with 44% of total exports and 34% of total 
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imports. EEC countries, however, constitute Equatorial Guinea's main trading 
partners. 
Overall, Franc Zone countries import from France, while export destinations 
are more diversified. Trade balance deficit, high debt service ratio and current 
account deficits are the main characteristics of the economic situation. It is 
customary when discussing the economic problems of SSA economies to have 
two styles of approach: the 'non-policy' approach which puts emphasis on 
exogenous international factors (terms of trade determination, interest rate, 
international economic growth rate etc.) and the 'policy approach', which 
emphasizes actions by African governments (external borrowing, state 
intervention in the market-commodity prices, state enterprises, exchange rate 
policy etc.). In the Franc Zone, the established monetary policy is both the 
'non-policy' and 'policy' approach. 
It is against this background that we investigate the net effect of the CFA 
monetary co-operation system. We do so through an analysis of the pooled 
reserves schemes. 
The gains from pooled reserves: a theoretical analysis 
and its application to the Franc Zone 
The establishment of a reserve fund by pooling reserves constitutes one form 
of payment arrangement among developing countries. The aim of such a 
reserve fund is to make possible savings in foreign exchange. This section 
examines the theoretical rationale for reserve pooling among a group of 
countries and then applies this theory to exploring the possibilities of gains 
from reserve pooling in the FZ. 
Dodsworth (1978) is among the economic theorists who proposed clear and 
simple arguments for reserve pooling. Following Dodsworth, Frenkel and 
Wadhva, one can ascertain that three main arguments explain the rationale for 
foreign reserve pooling. 
First, as Wadhva (1969, p.310) wrote: 'reserves pooling can help in 
substantial conservation of the foreign exchange reserves'. The availability of 
foreign exchange is well known to constitute a major factor in the potential 
for economic growth of many developing countries. Indeed, most of these 
countries need exchange reserves to pay for the imports of most intermediate 
goods needed for production. Hence reserve pooling is particularly attractive 
for developing economies. By spreading the risks, the variability of payments 
made from a reserve fund is reduced. The variability may derive from the time 
pattern of international payments. Note that the FZ scheme of reserves pooling 
was solvent until 1980, a time when both BCEAO and BEAC had an overdraft 
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on the operations account. In any case, according to Dodsworth, although a 
reserve pooling scheme implies collective provision, the benefits accruing to 
its members may be either public or private. It is public (or general) when, for 
instance, insurance cover increases, making benefits non-exclusive. It is private 
when it reduces individual countries' reserve requirements; in that case, the 
foreign exchange saved can be used as the concerned country sees fit. The 
level of benefits to be expected from a pooling scheme will depend on the 
determination of a common insurance or risk factor. Such a risk factor 
becomes important as larger proportions of existing reserves go into the central 
fund. 
The second argument for reserve pooling concerns the direct benefits 
member countries can draw from it. Pooled reserves increase bargaining 
strength through the reserve fund, relative to the bargaining strength of a single 
member. Another qualification relates to the demand for international reserves 
which may not be adequately explained by the variability of payments and the 
risk of illiquidity. Frenkel (1974) found other important determinants of 
international reserves demand, such as the level of imports, or more broadly 
the relative size of the foreign trade sector. Bahmani-Oskooee (1985), in his 
review article, put forth other explanatory variables for the demand for 
international reserves. These are expected export earnings, interest rate on 
foreign exchange holdings, the one-year lagged reserves, the change in money 
supply, capital inflow from abroad, government expenditures, etc. In any case, 
the main point remains that reserve pooling predominantly affects the 
variability of payments. 
The third argument deals with the indirect advantages of reserve pooling. 
They are derived from pooled information, the exchange of ideas and 
co-operative decision-making. These co-operative acts are likely to increase the 
propensity to co-operate and encourage regional co-operation and integration. 
However, one of the major problems of reserve pooling is the laxity that 
emerges from easy access to credit; this may create a less disciplined approach 
to the foreign balance position, what has been called the 'moral hazard' 
problem. 
Each of these three arguments affects the level of expected benefits to be 
derived from a reserve pooling scheme. They also have some implications for 
the optimal membership; in particular, it is no longer accepted that the greater 
the coverage of the scheme, the greater the benefits to be expected. 
Measuring the gains from pooling reserves 
Medhora (1992a) wrote that the potential gains from pooling reserves arise 
from the lower risk that results when reserves that show different patterns of 
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use are combined. Dodsworth (1975, p. 103) sums up the potential gains from 
pooling reserves thus: 
So long as the risk of abnormal demands on the reserve position is 
proportionately less when spread over a number of countries, then 
reserves economics are possible. Either total reserves required can be 
reduced or individual countries can benefit from an increased level of 
insurance cover. 
Dodsworth proposed the following statistics as a measure of the gains from 
pooling in an n-country case: 
Gain = 1 - (Var (Pr) / £ var (UPr) 
where: 
Pr = pooled reserves (operations account) 
UPr = unpooled reserves. 
This assumes a 100% pooling of reserves as was the case in UMOA before the 
1973 reform. 
Put differently, since the reduction in variability proxies the benefits from 
pooling, that is the fraction of reserves that can be saved is measured as: 
Gain ~ 1 - Variation of the sum of pooled reserves 
Sum of variation of unpooled reserves 
In a partial-pooling system, we can modify the above measure as follows: 
ft n 
Var E ™ i=l 
+ £ Var (1-P) Ri 
_i=1 
n 
£ VAR (UPRi) 
2 8 
where 
RESEARCH PAPER 19 
Ri = country's reserves; 
P = proportion of individual pooled reserves; 
0 < P < 1; 
1 = given country. 
If the last term of the numerator is greater than the denominator, the gains can 
be negative. To avoid the problem of negative gains, policy-makers have 
defined another measure of gains called 'coverage'. Gain is proxied by the 
coverage that can be provided by reserves held. In an international reserves 
system, 'coverage' refers to the number of months of imports they can pay for. 
Medhora's (1992a) formula is: 
Coverage, = reservesj / war (reserves). 
Using the concept of coverage to quantify the gains from pooling allows us to 
answer the question of how much additional reserves a union member would 
need to hold if it had left the pool and at the same time wanted to maintain the 
level of coverage it enjoyed in the pool. The answer is given by extra Ri = 
coverage * var (reserves i). With partial pooling, a country's reserve holdings 
are the proportion of its reserves not pooled plus the pooled reserves of all 
pool members. Coverage thus becomes: 
n 
(l-P) Ri + £ P . Ri 
a = ™ 
n 
var ( l -P) Ri + £ P . Ri 
This assumes that each country has unlimited access to the pool. 
Gains from pooled reserves in the Franc Zone 
How does this apply to FZ countries? The answer to this fundamental question 
depends upon the cornerstone of the FZ: the operations account. 
Many of the previous attempts to evaluate the gains from the pooled 
reserves in the Zone used estimates of the operations account. For the first 
time to our knowledge, actual operations account data have been published and 
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their evolution is very revealing of the solidarity that exists, and ought to 
prevail, in the Zone. In the following sections, we present the evolution of the 
operations account in the UMOA and in the BEAC Zone. 
Gains from pooled reserves in UMOA 
We start by presenting information on the operations accounts and their 
evolution (Table 4). Mali is missing from Table 4 since it rejoined the Union 
in 1984. Therefore we exclude the Malian operations account from the data 
series. The data provides some interesting features. Burkina Faso and Togo are 
the only two countries in the Union to hold a positive operations account 
throughout the period. 
The operations account is obtained from statistical documents of the 
BCEAO where the assets in foreign currencies are reported. Data on the 
operations account is included in the assets in foreign currencies as presented 
below. 
1. Foreign currencies of the FZ: 
1.1 operations account; 
1.2 FZ correspondents; 
1.3 notes and currencies of the FZ. 
2. Other foreign currencies: 
2.1 outside FZ correspondents; 
2.2 international financial institutions bills; 
2.3 compensation agreement in West Africa. 
Facing the assets in foreign currencies, we have the external liabilities, which 
include: 
• Liabilities in foreign currencies; 
• SDR allocated and IMF credits; 
• 'Fonds fiduciaire'; 
• Deposits by banks and foreign institutions; 
9 Deposits by banks and institutions common to UMOA; 
• Transfers to other states in UMOA and to the outside world. 
Table 4 Evolution of the operations account in UMOA countries (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo UMOA 
1978 344 3932.1 45087.9 15119.5 9955.7 11982 86421.8 
1979 4561.3 8600.7 19018.4 23409.9 18559.2 11451.5 85601 
1980 -4189.2 10676.6 -96488.5 21476.6 -28189.2 13938.2 -82775 
1981 14814.5 15277.9 -168591.4 25185.6 -59660.2 40828.2 -132145.4 
1982 -952.8 12053.6 -184086.4 5621.9 -65002.4 53243.3 -179122.8 
1983 -15879.9 23454.5 -241501.9 15313.3 -78835.7 73370.4 -224079.3 
1984 -19557.7 44666.7 -179044.6 36694.5 -52642.2 96122.3 -73761 
1985 -23521.3 46912.4 -65358.1 47473.9 -93239.3 111682.6 23950.2 
1986 -23617.6 69818.6 -85987.2 56957 -51852.5 106879.7 72198 
1987 -33077.2 80946.3 -156522.6 62783.9 -48972.9 94517.9 -324.5977 
1988 -42174.2 91714.6 -256525.7 66491.4 -75573.4 69992.8 -147074.5 
Source: Statistiques Economiques et Monetaires de la BCEAO; various documents at the Banque de France. 
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It is often the case that operations accounts and liabilities in foreign currencies 
represent about 98% of foreign currencies of the FZ and external liabilities 
respectively, which is the reason why some authors used these two elements 
as proxy variables for positive and negative operations account. In any case, 
the state of the data on operations account goes against the dominant position 
Cote d'lvoire and Senegal are supposed to hold in UMOA. Contrary to 
common beliefs, these two countries have had the largest deficits in the 
operations account of the Union. The data on the operations account show 
other salient features. Burkina Faso and Togo maintain a relatively low level 
of pooled reserves at the operations account. But these reserves have small 
variability, contrary to Cote d'lvoire and Senegal with high level of operations 
account and high variability as well. 
The variability of the operations account, as measured by their standard 
deviation, is expressed more clearly in Table 5. 
It appears clearly that Cote d'lvoire has the highest standard deviation, a 
high variability in the Ivorian operations account behaviour over time. We used 
the standard deviation relative to the coefficient of variation for the sake of 
comparability with previous studies (Medhora, 1992a). Using this variabijity 
measure, we computed the gains from pooled reserves in UMOA. The variance 
employed in the calculation is the standard deviation on yearly reserves for 
period 1978-88. Table 6 presents the results. 
We can observe that the gains increase with the degree of pooling. But, at 
65% of pooling, in the CFA franc arrangement; some gains have been realized. 
The percentage gains that would be obtained is 37.7% on our calculation. This 
is very close to Medhora's 35.1% gain. At 100% pooling, the% gains are 
higher than at 65%. Our results show 40.3% gains whereas Medhora's result 
is 54.1%. This difference could be explained by the fact that since 1980 the 
position of the operations account has deteriorated, affecting negatively the per 
cent gains from the pooling. The results indicate that some gains from pooling 
have been realized in UMOA. Such gains could have been greater had the 
•level of pooling been set at higher level. 
Another indicator of gains from pooled reserves that has been used is the 
coverage the pooled reserves can provide to Union members. Coverage in 
international parlance means the number of months (years) of imports these 
reserves could pay for. 
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Table 5 Variability of the operations account in UMOA 
Series Means S.D. 
(CFAF m) 
Benin -13022.736 17354.607 
Burkina Faso 37095.818 31669.447 
Cote d'lvoire -124636.37 97981.356 
Niger 34229.772 21111.881 
Senegal -47768.445 35215.018 
Togo 62182.681 38456.274 
Source: computed by the authors. Data from previous 
tables. 
Table 6 Gains from pooled reserves in UMOA (%) 
Gains 
Degree of pooling Our results Medhora 
65% 37.7 35.1 
100% 40.3 54.1 
Source: computed by the authors. 
Assuming most countries are risk-averse, coverage can be defined as the ratio 
of reserve holdings to risk: risk being the standard deviation of the reserves for 
the entire period: 
Coverage, = reserves, / variance of reserve, 
i = a given country 
reserve = yearly holdings or access to reserves 
variance (R) = the variability of reserves held, as indicated by the standard 
deviation during that period. 
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In this ratio of coverage, there are two sources of gain: either a reduction of 
the denominator (standard deviation) or increased access to the other country's 
reserves. In the event the variability of the pool becomes higher than the 
variability a country faced before pooling, this can offset the higher reserves 
available. 
The figures in Table 7 indicate that Cote d'lvoire has very low coverage 
level without the pool. On the contrary Burkina Faso has very high level since 
1986. Niger and Senegal seem to have higher degree of coverage. But these 
figures are nearly the same proportion as those computed by Medhora, using 
mean coverage rate for the entire period. 
Table 8 compares these two average coverage rates. To consider the 65% 
pooling scheme in UMOA, we computed the coverage rate with pooled 
reserves. Table 9 presents these results. 
Coverage under pooling is higher than without pooling for Cote d'lvoire, 
not for Burkina Faso. One observes that under pooling, the countries that 
enjoyed high coverage without pooling have reversed gains. Hence Cote 
d'lvoire, the largest country in terms of monetary aggregates, enjoys high gains 
in terms of coverage. To quantify the gains from pooling, the concept of 
coverage is used to compute the amount of reserves a union member has to 
hold if it had left the pool, and yet wanted to maintain the level of coverage 
it enjoyed in the Union. Such hypothetical reserves level can be computed as 
follows: 
H reserves; = coveraget x variability; 
This means that the reserves a given country (i) would have to hold is equal 
to the coverage it enjoyed in the pool times the variability in its own reserves. 
Table 10 shows these hypothetical reserves. 
The figures indicate that Cote d'lvoire would have to hold the highest level 
of reserves if it were not in the pool. On average Cote d'lvoire would have to 
hold 49.087 CFA million and Senegal 171.04 CFA million. 
Gains from pooled reserves in BEAC 
As in the case of UMOA, we first present the evolution of the key elements 
of the Franc Zone, the operations account (see Table 11). Let us recall that 
Equatorial Guinea is excluded from the series since this country joined BEAC 
only in 1985. Cameroon and Gabon are the two leading countries in BEAC. 
However, these two countries have been in overdraft since 1987. Congo, the 
third largest country in the BEAC Zone, has been in deficit since 1984. 
Curiously though, war-torn Chad and landlocked Central African Republic 
have been the providers of reserves in the pool for others to draw on. 
Table 7 Coverage rate without pooling of each country in UMOA 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 0.822473 0.240735 3.422326 1.292312 4.139546 0.377023 
1979 0.710284 0.385094 1.058557 1.250489 3.694441 0.332556 
1980 0.402419 0.423468 0.140901 1.187326 1.669874 0.391323 
1981 3.680403 0.565391 0.163737 1.277180 2.306732 0.982574 
1982 0.378628 0.596825 0.024473 0.434169 3.655324 1.315312 
1983 0.331536 0.951897 0.254126 0.904880 4.536213 1.571637 
1984 0.256872 1.365062 0.079877 1.730021 1.577552 2.120284 
1985 0.433129 1.841830 0.071480 2.735257 2.235673 3.180415 
1986 0.317579 2.376386 0.229772 2.924554 3.176293 2.749921 
1987 0.254413 2.834324 0.090548 3.333610 2.697928 2.545793 
1988 0.293665 2.819096 0.104686 3.080556 3.046474 1.647245 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Table 8 Average coverage without pooling 
in UMOA countries 
Country Our results Medhora 
Benin 0.71 1.41 
Burkina-Faso 1.30 3.30 
Cote d'lvoire 0.51 0.83 
Niger 1.83 2.42 
Senegal 3.0 2.38 
Togo 1.56 1.63 
Source: computed by the authors. 
The operations account evolution reveals some variability. This variability 
seems to be relatively high in Cameroon and Gabon, in positive as well as 
negative position. Such variability is shown through the variability indicator, 
the standard deviation as displayed below (Table 12). The operations account 
from Cameroon shows greater variability, like Cote d'lvoire in UMOA, 
followed by Gabon. Clearly, the larger countries in the CFA Zone seem to 
have very volatile reserves positions in the operations account at the 
French Treasury. 
The tables show that landlocked and poor Central African Republic held 
positive operations account balance from 1976 until 1988. Even war-torn Chad 
showed positive reserves at the French Treasury from 1981 until 1988, when 
most coastal countries were in deficit. Cameroon, the most important country 
in terms of monetary aggregates, fell in the deficit trap of the reserves from 
1986. So did Congo from 1983 until 1988. Gabon held relatively high levels 
of reserves all along, due to oil exports, but exhausted her reserves on the 
operations account from 1987 onwards. Overall, however, the total operations 
account level shows that only for the years 1987 and 1988 did the overall 
operations account become negative, and therefore, for the study period, only 
during those two years did the French Treasury intervene to advance cash to 
support budgetary disequilibrium of BEAC countries. From 1975 until 1986, 
the solidarity prevailing in the pooling system allowed one country in deficit 
to draw down on the positive reserves of the others. How much each country 
can draw on the other depends upon the position of each country at the 
operations account. 
Table 9 Coverage rate with pooling in UMOA 























0.741369 2.216858 0.875377 0.787466 0.714025 
0.736649 1.523033 0.787640 0.693763 0.696991 
0.988893 3.391138 1.068000 1.435487 0.947031 
-1.047982 0.642550 -1.123905 -0.684166 -1.042974 
-1.396944 0.088508 -1.528175 -1.076912 -1.402630 
-1.758920 0.388017 -1.913257 -1.371771 -1.832652 
-0.588467 1.675422 -0.626027 -0.190280 -0.641337 
0.324648 1.422912 0.329663 1.165763 0.360181 
0.680537 2.567732 0.705168 1.242111 0.637246 
0.124043 2.472790 0.101074 0.501635 0.093524 
-1.167993 1.767259 -1.262153 -0.667167 -1.171527 
Mean -0.146 -0.214 1.65 0.235 0.166 -0.240 
Source: computed by the authors 
Table 10 Hypothetical reserves out of the pool for UMOA countries 1978-88 (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 3169.159 25226.50 65929.47 19611.41 807.0340 29915.67 1979 2973.094 25065.90 45295.08 17645.82 711.0024 29201.97 
1980 4354.761 33648.96 100852.6 23933.27 1471.157 39677.94 
1981 -4644.187 -35659.59 19109.46 -25179.30 -701.1672 -43697.69 1982 -6244.669 -47533.68 2632.234 -34236.32 -1103.672 -58766.27 
1983 -7313.849 -59850.61 11539.66 -42863.47 -1405.858 -76782.98 1984 -1878.457 -20023.73 49827.14 -14025.13 -195.0082 -26870.22 
1985 1744.147 11046.76 42317.48 7385.563 1194.731 15090.58 1986 3436.629 23156.58 76364.48 15798.16 1272.976 26698.80 1987 1196.680 4220.793 73540.91 2264.395 514.1002 391836 1988 -3666.003 -39743.19 52558.38 -28276.53 -683.7459 -49083.70 
Mean -624.88 -7313.20 49087.89 -5267.47 171.04 -10063.411 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Table 11 
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Evolution of the operations account in BEAC countries (CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR BEAC 
1975 1501 1990 30326 -2203 -918 -30696 
1976 8138 1655 29835 -1381 -883 37364 
1977 7766 953 18837 4263 4352 36171 
1978 8715 1021 -6086 1711 5422 10783 
1979 22314 71 7367 -1293 3645 32104 
1980 38079 19153 22424 -7155 12403 84904 
1981 17320 33961 54782 -1218 19823 124668 
1982 10502 10449 104352 2002 14913 142218 
1983 60162 974 74410 9126 18273 162945 
1984 20461 -23676 92271 20641 23920 133617 
1985 47114 -17033 71290 10742 17863 129976 
1986 12569 -27423 33588 5281 20345 44360 
1987 -118825 -18804 -16462 14523 18943 -120625 
1988 -119515 -26845 -4061 22494 25646 -102281 
Mean 1164.35 -3111 36633.78 5538.07 13124.78 
Source: Statistiques Economiques et Finaricieres de la BEAC. Various documents of 
Banque de France. 
Table 12 Variability in the operations account in BEAC 
Series Mean S.D. 
(CFAF m) 
Cameroon 1164.3571 53610.421 
Congo -3111 17932.388 
Gabon 36633.786 37631.201 
Chad 5538.0714 8885.3683 
CAR 13124.786 9099.5309 
Source: computed by the authors. Data from previous 
tables. 
Using the concept of gains developed earlier and applied to UMOA, we 
computed the gains in the BEAC Zone (Table 13). 
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Table 13 Aggregate gains from pooled 
reserves in BEAC 
Degree of pooling Gains (%) 
65% 61.08 
100% 38.9 
Source: computed by the authors. 
It appears in the BEAC Zone that contrary to UMOA, member countries 
derived more gains with 65% reserve pooling than 100% pooling. This seems 
to lend credence to the fact that in the BEAC Zone where there does not exist 
a Union, little solidarity prevails among members relative to UMOA countries. 
Indeed, in BEAC, the credit allocation is based upon the weight carried by 
each member, not according to actual need. Using the concept of coverage, we 
calculated the coverage rate in the BEAC Zone, with and without pooling, as 
we did for UMOA. Tables 14 and 15 display such coverage rate. 
The mean values of these two coverage rates are displayed in Table 16. 
Table 16 indicates that Cameroon and Congo enjoyed a higher coverage with 
65% pooling than without pooling. Congo seems to benefit from greater 
coverage under the pooling system, up to 1.08 from 0.74, an increase of 
68.5%. Chad and Central African Republic on the other hand appear to benefit 
less from the pooling, their coverage having deteriorated during the study 
period. Based on the above information, we calculated the hypothetical amount 
of reserves each country would need had it opted out of the system using the 
same methodology as under UMOA: 
HRt = Coverage x variability 
Table 17 gives the hypothetical reserves. For the period of study, Cameroon 
appears to need more reserves than had the 65% pooling scheme not existed. 
All the other countries need lower reserves. But on average Gabon and 
Cameroon would have needed higher reserves without the pooling. Table 18 
indicates that Gabon would have needed 36,472 CFAF million had the 65% 
pooling scheme not existed. Gabon is followed by Cameroon with 28,463.74 
CFAF million. 
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Table 14 Coverage rate without pooling in BEAC 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 0.350921 0.322985 0.902369 0.097526 0.085139 
1976 0.594434 0.317354 0.800100 0.826913 0.466707 
1977 0.591502 0.362755 0.070182 0.686155 0.646004 
1978 0.670058 0.232227 0.146814 0.395663 0.564806 
1979 1.518680 0.980337 0.123433 0.356524 0.973269 
1980 2.266319 1.980604 0.654708 0.158674 1.204898 
1981 1.314767 3.658417 1.557557 0.295401 1.952406 
1982 1.254777 1.327230 2.954262 0.606470 1.580539 
1983 3.443173 0.306068 2.052973 1.586748 1.849413 
1984 1.336442 0.195988 2.512212 2.869639 2.387673 
1985 3.379911 0.194151 2.493572 2.235529 2.312288 
1986 1.160846 0.257741 1.261271 0.819368 2.347390 
1987 1.088362 0.111514 0.103960 2.329056 3.015442 
1988 2.529557 0.124608 0.565880 2.743888 3.338128 
Source: computed by the authors. 
More on the gains from pooling reserves on a country basis 
Using the above hypothetical reserves and the actual reserves held by the 
different countries, the reserves saved can be derived as follows: 
RSAVi = HRi - RSVi 
where: 
RSAVi = reserves saved for country /; 
HRi = hypothetical reserves that ought to be held; 
RSVi - actual reserves held. 
Tables 19 and 20 give the reserves saved for UMOA and BEAC. Based on the 
concepts of coverage with pooling we computed the above reserves savings in 
Tables 19 and 20, by subtracting actual reserves from hypothetical reserves. 
Those reserves savings represent in fact the gains from reserves pooling by 
each member country. Tables 19 and 20 reveal that in UMOA, only Cote 
d'lvoire obtained some savings from pooling reserves of 33,940.6 CFAF 
million. All of the other countries did in fact dissave, that is they contributed 
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more to the pool than they drew from it between 1978 and 1988. Similarly, in 
BHAC, between 1975 and 1988, Cameroon and Congo derived positive 
r e se r ve s savings from the pooling. That is by being member of the Zone, these 
two countries acquired reserves beyond their own actual need. Gabon, Chad 
and CAR, however, dissaved because of the pool. In order to understand the 
interpretation of the above statements more fully, the overall situations of the 
operations account of each zone are presented in Table 21. 
Table 15 Coverage rate with 65% pooling in BEAC countries 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 0.563119 0.398764 0.415497 0.420530 0.420786 
1976 0.773269 0.594025 0.578666 0.659677 0.662441 
1977 0.352162 0.272985 0.058236 0.249578 0.275867 
1978 0.359108 0.258795 0.390911 0.256927 0.254194 
1979 0.675501 0.581665 0.461412 0.521187 0.562512 
1980 1.406521 1.070404 1.130612 1.176866 1.107467 
1981 1.953050 1.459267 1.516377 1.501099 1.499545 
1982 2.558030 1.891980 1.927781 1.895824 1.936337 
1983 2.828392 2.234074 2.266765 2.230339 2.278879 
1984 2.832808 2.480744 2.215711 2.170250 2.245855 
1985 3.260286 2.631160 2.607555 2.462779 2.544224 
1986 1.995231 1.818218 1.657736 1.476177 1.548552 
1987 1.174115 -0.445497 -0.461152 -0.661463 -0.575590 
1988 1.901438 -0.082101 -0.137257 -0.452388 -0.340770 
Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 16 Average coverage with and without pooling in BEAC 
Countries Without pooling With 65% pooling 
Cameroon 1.53 1.61 
Congo 0.74 1.08 
Gabon 1.15 1.05 
Chad 1.14 0.99 
RCA 1.16 1.03 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Hypothetical reserves for BEAC countries (CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 9914.650 3654.011 14414.10 2827.745 4056.710 
1976 13614.70 5443.252 20074.63 4435.826 6396.453 
1977 6200.397 2501.450 2020.269 1678.223 2659.572 
1978 6322.694 2371.432 13561.18 1727.638 2450.629 
1980 24794.16 9808.479 39222.30 7913.533 10676.86 
1981 34386.72 13371.76 52604.95 10093.75 14456.80 
1982 45038.40 17336.86 66877.05 12747.98 18667.82 
1983 49798.57 20471.58 78636.82 14997.34 21970.19 
1984 49876.33 22731.90 76865.70 14593.29 21651.82 
1985 57402.79 24110.22 93581.44 16560.32 24528.33 
1986 35129.38 16660.95 57508.86 9926.172 14929.26 
1987 20672.26 -4082.242 -15997.93 -4447.835 -5549.140 
1988 33478.00 -751.3173 -4761.601 -3041.967 -3285.292 
Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 18 Average hypothetical reserves in 







Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 19 Reserves savings from pooling in UMOA countries (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 -329.1501 17035.04 -35166.23 -9340.770 -3435.374 14119.47 
1979 -47.53003 11962.35 14025.24 -10369.40 -3351.950 15268.81 
1980 2643.393 19239.67 96690.38 -2666.881 -240.2111 23282.61 
1981 -20295.84 -54898.08 14272.67 -53792.47 -3065.218 -84864.80 
1982 -7854.858 -67842.78 1909.292 -43963.18 -4849.826 -113874.2 
1983 -8723.772 -92240.71 4032.778 -63135.86 -6054.790 -142630.2 
1984 -2970.857 -66472.58 47467.56 -52783.48 -1811.760 -115704.2 
1985 -97.81897 -51625.01 40205.96 -53893.50 -1096.495 -118159.9 
1986 2086.059 -57704.47 69577.00 -49721.80 -1982.244 -88515.20 
1987 114.7361 -92222.50 70866.10 -72419.81 -2250.868 -102743.2 
1988 -4914.873 -135668.3 49465.94 -97291.47 -3805.921 -118098.6 
Mean -3671.90 -51857.85 33940.6 -46307.15 -2904.05 -75629.03 
Source: computed by the author. 
Table 20 Reserves savings from pooling in the BEAC countries (CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 4468.633 481.1118 -17551.24 1951.827 2937.245 
1976 4154.610 2217.518 -8602.490 -1469.854 1416.851 
1977 -3755.867 -968.6040 -507.0759 -3066.291 -3764.216 
1978 -5007.653 105.0430 07846.074 -1067.383 -3174.963 
1979 -13966.83 -3964.269 10990.75 834.4141 -4359.266 
1980 -13308.48 -8912.969 14710.85 6230.534 -1725.346 
1981 13778.70 -20932.05 -3841.211 7321.647 -5430.260 
1982 26273.61 4163.090 -38677.08 7677.550 2055.841 
1983 -7144.879 16472.10 3810.133 3160.170 2522.930 
1984 30031.15 19609.18 -13811.30 -5838.900 -2961.250 
1985 2135.020 20923.89 2784.453 238.9297 430.2598 
1986 17286.27 13326.71 11116.32 3643.823 -8800.529 
1987 3037.21-1 -4865.806 -18870.69 -19762.73 -34211.85 
1988 -8585.559 -1850.230 -24174.27 -21255.73 -35225.62 
Mean 3528.28 2557.47 -5341.19 -1528.71 -6449.29 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Table 21 Overall balance of operations account 
in UMOA and BEAC (CFAF million) 








































Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 21 shows the state of solidarity that prevailed in the two zones and 
the extent to which France intervened through advances by the French 
Treasury. In UMOA, for the years 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1987 and 1988, the 
overall balance of the operations account has been in deficit. That is exactly 
the situation in which France intervened by providing cash advances for 
budgetary purposes. 
During the other years, countries with a negative operations account balance 
drew down on the operations account of the others, namely, Benin, Cote 
d'lvoire, Senegal drew on the account of Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo. This 
expresses some solidarity between member countries. 
As for the BEAC Zone, France intervened only twice during our study 
period, in 1987 and in 1988. From 1975 until 1986, countries with deficit 
operations accounts such as Chad, drew down on the account of others. 
In the BEAC Zone, only Congo showed a continuous negative balance 
between 1984 and 1988. Otherwise, most countries used their own reserves. 
Therefore, there appears to be less solidarity in the BEAC Zone than in 
UMOA. 
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Overall, the FZ allows member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties 
to draw on the reserves of other countries and thus enable them to pay for 
their imports. 
If the account is in deficit for the whole Zone then the French Treasury 
provides the necessary foreign exchange to pay for imports. Under such 
circumstances, the system appears to be beneficial. 
But to maintain an operations account at the French Treasury is not 
cost-free. There are two kinds of opportunity costs: one related to the interest 
rate and the other to exchange risks. It is therefore necessary to compute the 
net gains from pooling reserves to have a clear picture of how beneficial the 
Zone is to member countries. First are the costs related to the interest rate. 
COSTs = (i* -i) * CO 
where 
COST = opportunity cost related to the interest rate; 
i*= interest rate of reference; 
i = average interest rate available to the operations account; 
j = country j (j = 1, 2 ...). 
For our computation we used LIBOR as the reference interest rate; we used 
IRFce as the average rate of intervention of Banque de France. This is an 
approximation. Indeed, at the operations account, the interest rate is the 
average of the intervention of Banque de France on public assets in the short 
run, when the operations account is in overdraft. In case of deficit, as has been 
the case since 1980, the interest rate structure charged is as follows: 
® From 0 - 5 million FF : i = 1%; 
8 From 5 - 1 0 million FF : i = 2%; 
9 Above 10 million FF: the interest rate is the same as when the operations 
account has positive balance. For the interest, we computed the following 
opportunity costs related to the interest rate received or paid by member 
countries. 
How should one interpret these results? There are four alternatives since COST, 
is the product of the operations account balance (COi) and the interest rate 
differential. 
COST} = (i* - i) CO 
We have thus either: 
(a) Operations account positive and (7* - i) positive; 
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(b) Operations account positive and (i* - i) negative; 
(c) Operations account negative and (/* - i) positive; 
(d) Operations account negative and (/* - i) negative. 
In the case of (a) and (d), the result is a positive cost. In that case, it is real 
cost to the country. In the case of (b) and (c) we have negative costs, that is 
a gain for the country. In other words, in UMOA, two countries obtained some 
gains by maintaining the pooled reserves: Burkina Faso and Togo, the two 
countries that held positive balances at the operations account. Niger has a 
special case where she supports an opportunity cost while holding a positive 
balance in the operations account. All other countries paid interest to the 
French Treasury. On average Benin paid 10,945.47 CFAF million in interest 
during 1978-88, and Senegal 33,690.9 CFAF million. On the other hand, 
Burkina Faso received 12,592.7 CFAF million and Togo 39,465.4 CFAF 
million. Overall in UMOA, these are more losers than gainers with respect to 
the interest rate (see Table 22). 
In the BEAC Zone, in contrast to UMOA, only Congo paid more interest 
to the French Treasury than it received, paying 8,516.51 CFAF million. All 
other countries received interest payments. On average, during 1975-88, 
Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, CAR received in payment respectively 10,214.03 
CFAF million, 37,546.69 CFAF million, 5,336.85 CFAF million, and 3,852.69 
CFAF million (see Table 23). The second cost associated with reserve pooling 
is due to the exchange rate changes. Indeed, 65% pooled reserves are 
denominated only in FF, so that only transactions in other hard currencies 
carry conversion costs. These costs stem from the fact that there is usually a 
differential between the buying and selling rates of FF, especially with respect 
to the US dollar. The opportunity cost associated is defined as: 
KOST, = (TV - TA) * CO, 
where 
TV = selling rate 
TA = buying rate 
CO = operations account balance 
/ = country 
To compute the above costs some assumptions are needed: 
• All of the balance of the operations account is converted; 
• The conversions are only in dollars. 
Table 22 Costs of the pooled reserves associated with the interest rate in UMOA (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 330.2399 3774.815 43284.37 14514.71 9557.469 11503.29 
1979 11813.77 22275.81 49257.66 60631.64 48068.32 29659.38 
1980 -9090.565 23166.22 -209380.0 480604.2 -61170.57 30245.89 
1981 21777.31 22458.51 -24729.4 37022.68 -87700.49 60017.45 
1982 1210.056 -15308.07 233789.4 -7137.813 82553.05 -67618.99 
1983 41764.14 -61685.34 635150.1 -40273.98 207337.9 -192964.2 
1984 10365.57 -23673.34 94893.58 -19448.07 27900.35 -50944.79 
1985 30577.69 -60986.12 84965.53 -61716.07 121211.1 -145187.4 
1986 21964.36 -64931.29 79968.09 -52970.00 48222.82 -99398.11 
1987 22161.73 -54234.02 104870.1 -42065.22 32811.84 -63327.00 
1988 -32474.13 70620.24 -198294.8 51198.38 -58191.52 53894.45 
Mean 10945.47 -12592.7 60970.45 -1240.13 33690.9 -39465.4 
Source: computed by authors. 
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Table 23 Costs of the pooled reserves associated with the interest rate in BEAC 
(CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 -1395.930 -1850.701 -28203.19 2048.791 853.7403 
1976 -24251.25 -4931.901 -88908.33 4115.381 6231.341 
1977 -23841.52 -2925.710 -57829.59 -13087.41 -13360.64 
1978 8366.397 980.1596 -5842.558 1642.559 5205.118 
1979 57793.26 183.89 19080.53 -3348.870 9440.550 
1980 82631.43 41562.01 48660.08 -15526.35 26914.51 
1981 25460.40 49922.67 80529.54 -1790.460 29139.81 
1982 -13337.54 -13270.23 -132527.0 -2542.540 -18939.51 
1983 -158226.1 -2561.62 -195698.3 -24001.38 -48057.99 
1984 -10844.32 12548.27 -48903.60 -10939.72 -12677.59 
1985 -61248.20 22142.90 -92677.00 -13964.40 -23221.90 
1986 -11689.17 25503.38 -31236.83 -4911.329 -18920.85 
1987 79612.76 12598.68 11029.54 -9730.411 -12691.81 
1988 -92026.55 -20670.65 -3126.97 17320.38 19747.42 
Mean -10214.05 8516.51 -37546.69 -5336.85 -3852.69 
Source: computed by authors. 
Since it is difficult to obtain the continuous fluctuations of exchange rate of 
1-T' vis a vis the dollar, we use the average rate. The differential is calculated 
as the pivot rate plus and minus 5%, which roughly approximate the 
commercial gains realized by commercial banks resulting from change 
operations. 
To obtain accurate figures, we first converted the operations account into 
dollars, and then multiplied by the exchange rate differential. The results were 
obtained for UMOA and BEAC (see Tables 24 and 25). 
How should we read these results? Two cases must be considered. First, in 
the case of positive balance at the operations account, member countries 
support a double exchange risk, when 65% of the export earnings is converted 
from, say, coffee, cocoa or petroleum to a hard currency (US dollar) into FFs 
to keep them in the operations account. The other exchange risk is when we 
reconvert the pooled reserves from FFs into, say, US dollars to pay for 
imports. 
Second, in the case of negative balances on the operations account, member 
countries support two costs: the interest paid for the French Treasury advances 
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and simultaneously the conversion costs. An advance by the French Treasury 
is a kind of borrowing at a special rate. Hence the figures in Tables 24 and 25 
should be read as absolute values. In such cases all member countries 
supported costs. In UMOA, for instance, during 1978 and 1988, Benin, Cote 
d'lvoire and Senegal supported exchange costs of 1,257.67 CFAF million, 
11,880.85 CFAF million, and 4,517.61 CFAF million respectively. Benin 
supported the smallest exchange costs. In the BEAC Zone, Gabon supported 
the highest exchange costs at 7,516.82 CFAF million, whereas Congo 
supported only 19,052 CFAF million. There does appear to be some correlation 
between the balance of the operations account and the costs associated with 
exchange risks. For instance, Gabon, with the highest mean value of operations 
account, also supported the highest exchange costs. On the other hand, Congo 
with a negative mean value of operations account (that is the smallest balance) 
also supported the smallest exchange costs. We can therefore establish a 
positive correlation between the operations account balance and the exchange 
costs. 
Given the gains by country, and the above costs of the pooled reserves, the 
next step is to compute the net gains (losses) of the pooled reserves. Net gains 
for country (i) is given by: 
Netg, = Gain, - COST, - KOST, 
where 
Netg, = net gain for country /; 
Gain, = gross gain for country i (RSAVi); 
COSTj = interest-rate associated cost for country /; 
KOSTj = exchange rate transaction for /; 
Under the reservations of the assumptions made about the average intervention 
rate of the Banque de France and of the total conversion of the operations 
account only in dollars, the following net gains were derived (Tables 26 and 
27). 
During the study period, one observed that all UMOA countries were net 
losers based on the gains derived from the operations account system. The 
highest losers were, in decreasing order, Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso. 
Curiously enough these three countries are precisely those which held positive 
operations account balances during the study period. These three countries 
provided more to the pooled exchange reserves than they needed to cover their 
imports. Cote d'lvoire, Benin and Senegal, with negative operations account 
balances, are also net losers but to a lesser degree. In the BEAC Zone, there 
are two countries with net gains, Gabon and Chad, with 24,688.67 CFAF 
Table 24 Exchange rate costs of pooled reserves in UMOA (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 68.79999 786.4202 9017.581 3023.900 1991.140 2396.520 
1979 912.2599 1720.140 3803.680 4681.9802 3711.840 2290.300 
1980 -418.9201 2135.320 -9648.851 4295.320 -2818.921 2787.640 
1981 1481.450 3055.580 -16859.14 5037.120 -5966.020 8165.639 
1982 -95.28001 2410.721 -18408.64 1124.380 -6500.241 10648.66 
1983 -1587.990 4690.899 -24150.19 3066.660 -7883.571 14674.08 
1984 -1955.770 8933.341 -17904.46 7338.900 -5264.219 19224.46 
1985 -2352.130 9382.482 -6535.812 9494.779 -9323.929 22336.52 
1986 -2361.760 13963.72 -8598.719 11391.40 -5185.251 21375.94 
1987 -3307.719 16189.26 -15652.26 12556.78 -4897.291 18903.58 
1988 -4217.419 18342.92 -25752.57 13298.28 -7557.341 13998.56 
Mean -1257.67 7419.16 -11880.85 6845.95 -4517.61 12436.53 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Exchange rate costs of pooled reserves in BEAC (CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 300.2000 398.0000 6065.200 -220.3000 -91.80001 
1976 1627.600 331.0000 5967.002 -138.1000 -88.30000 
1977 1553.200 190.6000 3767.400 852.6000 870.4000 
1978 1743.000 204.2000 -608.6000 342.2000 1084.400 
1979 4462.802 14.20000 1473.400 -129.3000 728.9999 
1980 7615.799 3830.600 4484.798 -715.4999 2480.600 
1981 3464.000 6792.201 10956.40 -121.8000 3964.600 
1982 2100.400 2089.800 20870.40 400.4001 2982.600 
1983 12032.40 194.8000 14882.00 1825.200 3654.600 
1984 4092.200 -2367.600 18454.20 4128.201 4784.001 
1985 9422.799 -1703.300 14258.00 2148.400 3572.601 
1986 2513.800 -2742.300 6717.601 1056.200 4069.000 
1987 -11882.50 -1880.400 -1646.200 2904.600 3788.600 
1988 -11951.50 -2684.500 -406.1001 4498.799 5129.200 
Mean 1935.30 190.52 7516.82 1202.25 2637.82 
Source: computed by the authors. 
million and 2,605.88 CFAF million respectively. Cameroon appears to loose 
the most. Overall, if one adds the costs associated with interest rate and 
exchange rate, the evidence shows more countries lose than gain in the FZ 
with 65% reserve pooling. These results derive from the fact that the interest 
payments received by maintaining reserves at the French Treasury are smaller 
in magnitude than the losses incurred through exchange costs. 
The differential in interest rates paid or received by FZ countries, relative 
to the market rate proxied by the LIBOR are presented in Table 28. As we 
reported earlier, given the signs of DIFRI, CFA Zone countries with negative 
operations account balance and negative interest differential support interest 
costs. But, countries with positive operations account balance and negative 
interest differential gained in interest payments. Even more important,. in 
addition to the variation in interest differential, is the diversification of export 
destinations and origins of imports UMOA and BEAC countries experience 
over the years. For instance, at independence in 1960, Cote d'lvoire exported 
over 50% of its total exports to France. This share decreased to 32.66% in 
1970 and reached 21.66% in 1980. It continued to decline to 16.56% in 1985 
and to 14.8% (behind the Netherlands at 16.9%) in 1988 (M'bet, 1990, p.44). 
Table 26 Net gains (losses) in UMOA (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 -728.6109 12473.80 -87468.18 -26879.38 -14983.98 219.6597 
1979 -12773.56 -12033.61 -39036.10 -75683.02 -55132.11 -16680.87 
1980 12152.88 -6063.871 315719.2 -527566.4 63749.28 -9750.921 
1981 -43554.60 -80412.16 278961.2 -95852.41 90601.30 -153047.9 
1982 -8969.634 -54944.43 -213471.8 -37947.75 -80902.63 -56903.87 
1983 -48899.92 -35246.26 -606967.2 -25924.54 -205509.1 35659.92 
1984 -11380.66 -51732.57 -29521.56 -40674.31 -24447.89 -83983.88 
1985 -28323.38 -21.37305 -38223.76 -1672.209 -112983.7 4690.988 
1986 -17516.54 -6736.899 -1792.352 -8143.201 -45019.81 -10493.03 
1987 -18739.28 -54177.74 -18351.74 -42911.38 -30165.42 -58319.78 
1988 31776.68 -224631.5 273513.3 -161788.1 61942.94 -185991.6 
Mean -13359.69 -46684.2 -15148.99 -95003.8 -32077.3 -48600.11 
Source: computed by the authors. 
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Table 27 Net gains (losses) in BEAC (CFAF million) 
Year Cameroon Congo Gabon Chad CAR 
1975 5564.363 1933.813 4586.749 123.3370 2175.305 
1976 26778.26 6818.419 74338.84 -5447.135 -1126.190 
1977 18532.55 1766.506 53555.11 9168.520 8726.023 
1978 -15117.05 -1079.317 14297.23 -3052.142 -9464.481 
1979 -76222.89 -4162.358 -9563.180 4312.585 -14528.82 
1980 -103555.7 -54305.58 -38434.03 22472.38 -31120.46 
1981 -15145.70 -77646.92 -95327.15 9233.907 -38534.67 
1982 37510.75 15343.53 72979.52 9819.690 18012.75 
1983 139048.8 18838.92 184626.4 25336.35 46926.32 
1984 36783.26 9428.510 16638.10 972.6187 4932.339 
1985 53960.41 484.2903 81203.45 12055.13 20079.56 
1986 26461.64 -9434.361 35635.55 7498.952 6051.320 
1987 -64693.05 -15584.09 -28254.03 -12936.92 -25308.64 
1988 95392.48 21504.92 -20641.20 -43074.91 -60102.24 
Mean -11807.008 -6149.55 24688.67 2605.88 -5434.42 
Source: computed by the authors. 
As for imports M'Bet (1990, p.55) showed that Cote d'lvoire imported 69.24% 
from France. This share declined to 44.47% in 1970 and reached 39.80% in 
1980. In 1985 the share declined further to 32.06%, and reached 30.6% in 
1988 as appears in Table 29. 
This picture is similar, although not identical, to other UMOA countries as 
well as BEAC countries. However, for the BEAC Zone in general, countries 
imported more from France than UMOA countries. For instance, Cameroon 
imported 40% from France in 1988, Central African Republic imported 52.4% 
from France in 1988, as appears in Table 29. Moreover, BEAC countries seem 
to export more to France than UMOA countries. For instance, Gabon exported 
36% to France in 1988 compared to 30.6% for Cote d'lvoire. This drive for 
diversification of geographical areas for exports and imports can be 
summarized for 1988 as follows. It can be observed from Table 29 that BEAC 
countries trade more with France than do UMOA countries. Trading more with 
France means holding export earnings in FF and paying imports in FF, with 
no exchange risks. This is one of the reasons why there are more net gainers 
in BEAC than in UMOA countries. 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE FRANC ZONE 5 5 
Table 28 Comparative evolution between the average 
intervention rate of Banque de France and LIBOR 
Year IRFCE LIBOR DIFR1 
1975 7.92 6.99 -0.93 
1976 8.56 5.58 -2.98 
1977 9.07 6.00 -3.07 
1978 7.98 8.94 0.96 
1979 9.04 11.63 2.59 
1980 11.85 14.02 2.17 
1981 15.30 16.77 1.47 
1982 14.87 13.60 -1.27 
1983 12.53 9.90 -2.63 
1984 11.74 11.21 -0.53 
1985 9.93 8.63 -1.30 
1986 7.74 6.81 -0.93 
1987 7.98 7.31 -0.67 
1988 7.36 8.13 0.77 
Source: derived by the authors, data IFS. 
Notes: IRFCE: average intervention rate of Banque de 
France. LIBOR: reference rate (London Inter Banking 
Official Rate). DIFRI: LIBOR minus IRFCE. 
In UMOA countries, France's share of foreign trade declined more 
substantially than in BEAC. This implies that UMOA countries need to convert 
more export earnings from other hard currencies into FF at 65% proportion to 
be kept at the French Treasury. This explains the high exchange costs in 
UMOA countries. This implies also that there are more net losers in UMOA 
countries. Overall, the highest net losers are countries in the Franc Zone with 
large positive operations account balance trading to a large degree (more than 
60% outside the FZ). Trading more outside the FZ implies higher exchange 
costs and since exchange risks costs outweigh interest payments, this leads to 
the net losses. 
However, the overall membership gains of a monetary union go beyond the 
simple reserves savings minus interest and exchange rate costs. Such gains 
must include the net transfers within the Zone. We therefore compute the total 
gains of the Franc Zone based on UMOA data
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Table 29 Percent share of export destinations and import origins 
in UMOA and BEAC countries (1988) 
Importation 
U M O A B E A C 
Benin France 21% Cameroon France 40% 
Burkina-Faso France 31% Congo France 47% 
Cote d'lvoire France 30.6% Gabon France 45% 
Niger France 32.3% CAR France 52.4% 
Senegal France 36.4% 
Togo France 24.8% 
Exportation 
U M O A B E A C 
Benin USA 20.1% Cameroon France 28.2% 
Burkina-Faso France 34.4% Congo USA 42% 
Cote d'lvoire Holland 16.9% Gabon France 36% 
Niger France 80% CAR France 42.3% 
Senegal France 28.5% Chad France 25% 
Togo France 12.2% 
Source: computed by the authors; data from IPS, various issues. 
The total net gains from Franc Zone membership 
The overall net benefits of a union membership go beyond the mere reserves 
saving minus interest and exchange rate costs. Indeed, coverage should be 
enlarged to include a wider evaluation of the costs and benefits that 
incorporate the net transfers. Because of free transferability within the Franc 
Zone, a great deal of currency movement occurs among countries. 
Unfortunately, scanty data make it difficult to assess quantitatively how much 
money circulates in the Zone. Moreover, huge unrecorded transfers are known 
to exist in the CFA Zone, especially between France and African members. 
According to a report in Africa Analysis (8 June 1990, p. 6), the French 
Treasury figures show a steep rise in CFA banknotes. 
An estimated 446 CFAF billion were sent out of the Zone in 1988 alone, 
about 47% of the total issues. In the BEAC Zone, this outflow amounted to 
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77% (270 CFAF billion), while in UMOA, it was about 30% (176 CFAF 
billion). No matter how qualified the report sources are, it has become well-
known that important capital flight does occur from CFA countries to France. 
The matter reached such an extent that it became more and more difficult to 
exchange CFA at French banks. CFA franc holders were directed to the 
Banque de France, and even some French commercial banks are charging a 
one per cent commission for converting CFA to French francs. The situation 
has worsened to the point that since 1991 only the Banque de France is 
allowed to convert CFAF into FF, with a 3% service charge. Commercial 
banks in France can no longer carry on such conversion operations. Thus, the 
CFAF is no longer freely convertible into FF. The point should be made that 
the official transfer records are at best only partial and an incomplete aspect 
of fund movements in the Zone. 
Despite enormous difficulties, we were able to collect data on bank and 
postal transfers within UMOA and between UMOA countries and France. 
Using these data, we computed the gains of Franc Zone membership. Such 
gain is defined as the net gain by country from which we deduct the net 
transfers. Algebraically, we have: 
UMGaini = NetGi - NetRi, 
where 
UMGaini is the union membership gain; 
NetRi is the net transfers, the difference between the transfers received from 
and paid to other members; 
i is a given country. 
l-'rom the above data, we computed the net transfers, as shown in Table 30. 
Data availability allowed us to compute net transfers for Benin only for the 
period 1978 until 1985, for Burkina Faso 1978-87, and for the other four 
countries, 1978-88. Table 30 presents the net transfers to all countries in 
UMOA. On average Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire and Senegal benefited from 
positive net transfers. In other words, those three countries received more 
transfers from France and other UMOA members than they paid. Benin, Niger 
and Togo experience the reverse. 
Our primary aim is to deduct the net transfers from the net gain we 
computed earlier to obtain the gains of CFA Zone membership. 
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UMGi = Netgi - NetRi, 
where, 
UMGi is the union membership gain for a given country given the net gain 
derived for the operations account; 
Netgi is union membership total net gains (as below). 
One can clearly observe that only Benin is benefiting from the Franc Zone 
membership. All other countries in the West African Monetary Union are 
actually losing from being a member, based on our data, and for the study 
period where data were available. On average, Cote d'lvoire loses most, by 
about 177,567.47 CFAF million a year from 1978 to 1988. This is followed 
by Niger with 73,179.85 CFAF million net loss. Senegal is the third largest 
loser, with on average 46,593.88 CFAF million a year from 1978 to 1987, 
followed by Burkina Faso with 31,025.16 CFAF million. Togo loses least. 
Our results reveal that independent from the operations account position, most 
countries do not benefit from the CFA arrangement. This seems to reinforce 
our earlier findings. Furthermore, let us recall that the official data we used do 
not take into account the considerable unrecorded transfers of money within 
the Zone, especially between the African members and France. If one could 
add those data to the official data, one could easily speculate that it is highly 
likely that the membership loss would be higher (Table 31). 
One of the main advantages of the CFA system is to allow member 
countries to have easy access to foreign capital, through borrowing. This stems 
from the strict monetary policy that prevents money printing as a way of 
financing the economy and instead uses foreign money, thus increasing the 
debt of member countries. It is therefore adequate to examine how the bedrock 
of the whole system, that is the operations account, relates to the external debt 
situation in CFA countries. 
Relationship between the operations account and debt 
It is often argued that due to the existence of the FZ, and especially the' 
scheme of the operations account, CFA countries borrow easily abroad and 
hence increase external debt. 
Tables 32 and 33 show the evolution of these two sets of data as well as the 
ratio of debt to the balance of the operations account. Data on debt were 
available only for 1980-87. The ratios of debt to the operation is RDCOi. 
These ratios show that debt is several times the balance of the operations 
account. The ratios are highest in UMOA for Cote d'lvoire and Senegal. For 
BEAC, Cameroon and Gabon have the highest ratios. 
Table 30 The state and the evolution of net transfers in UMOA countries (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 -35093.90 -34039.60 90709.30 -9342.40 5237.80 5459.30 
1979 -47254.50 -35406.10 783730.0 -629.00 -3113.70 1172.00 
1980 -43085.40 -45529.60 62535.50 -34937.30 -14769.10 -1486.30 
1981 -45215.30 -47349.30 68490.80 -32114.10 -27394.00 11759.60 
1982 -53018.60 -62117.40 113918.80 -42261.80 -35373.30 15584.30 
1983 -59797.10 -67260.40 -8096.20 -17351.40 -33569.70 -43896.60 
1984 -62669.00 -60973.50 208488.70 -140169.00 7069.89 -14007.10 
1985 -66416.01 -65034.70 2016034.90 -4966.40 10825.80 -77003.90 
1986 NA -45379.50 88984.80 18662.30 49660.40 -82447.20 
1987 NA -37500.40 63064.10 13396.60 92842.10 -71285.60 
1988 NA NA 113173.40 9670.20 108175.40 -109107.4 
Mean -51568.7 -2135.65 162418.46 -21824.02 14516.50 -33205.35 
Source: computed by the authors; data from BCEAO publications, Statistiques monetaires, various issues. 
Table 31 The state and the evolution of union membership gains in UMOA countries (CFAF million) 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1978 34365.29 46513.40 -178177.5 -17536.98 -20311.78 -5239.64 
1979 34480.94 23372.49 -822766.10 -75054.02 -52018.41 -17852.87 
1980 55238.28 39465.73 253183.70 -492629.10 78518.38 -8264.621 
1981 1660.699 -33062.86 210470.40 -63738.31 117995.30 -164807.50 
1982 44048.97 7172.969 -327390.60 4314.051 -45529.33 -72488.17 
1983 10897.18 32014.14 -598871.0 -8573.139 -171939.40 79556.52 
1984 51288.34 -512706.10 -238010.30 99494.69 -31517.79 -69976.78 
1985 380.63 65013.32 -239827.70 3316.191 -123809.50 81694.88 
1986 NA 38642.60 -90777.15 -26805.50 -94680.20 71954.17 
1987 NA -16677.34 -81415.84 -56307.98 -123007.50 12965.82 
1988 NA NA 160339.90 -171458.30 -46232.46 -76884.20 
Mean 33759.04 -31025.16 -177567.47 -73179.85 -46593.88 -15394.76 
Source: computed by the authors; data source as in Table 35. 
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The figures in Table 34 and 35 give mixed signals. In UMOA, Benin and 
Senegal have negative correlation coefficient between debt and the operations 
account, That is, the operations account and debt move in opposite directions. 
Benin has the strongest association (-0.84) between debt and the operations 
account. 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Niger and Togo have on the contrary positive 
coefficients. That is debt moves along with the operations account. It is 
striking that the three countries that held positive operations accounts are 
precisely those with high correlation coefficients. This lends credence to the 
observation that the existence of the operations account with positive balance 
allows CFA countries greater indebtedness. This does not imply a causal 
relationship between the operations account and debt, but rather some degree 
of association between the two variables. For these countries, the high 
correlation coefficients mean that the evolution of the operations account 
contributes to a large extent to the debt situation. That is the reason why these 
countries continue to add to the pooled reserves while at the same time they 
borrow from the IMF and from the World Bank. In fact, the cash advances 
made under the operations account do not constitute a financing fund but only 
temporary budgetary relief. For instance for investment projects in phosphates, 
Togo prefers to borrow at the international institutions where technical 
assistance is provided. This is valid for other CFA countries: French Treasury 
cash advances are used mainly for budgetary purposes (to pay civil servants 
for instance) while borrowing from international financial institutions is geared 
towards investment projects. Since the IMF and the World Bank provide 
feasibility studies and technical assistance, CFA countries turn to these 
investment funds. 
The case of Cote d'lvoire is rather peculiar; indeed, that country has a 
positive correlation coefficient despite a negative operations account since 
1980 during our study period. However, the coefficient is relatively low (0.42); 
this indicates that the evolution of the operations account does not explain 
fully the increase of the Ivorian debt. 
For BEAC countries, Cameroon, Congo and Gabon have negative 
correlation coefficients and Central African Republic and Chad have positive 
coefficients. For Congo, the evolution of the operations account explains to a 
large degree the level of the debt. 
But beyond the issue of total net membership gains, the question arises as 
to whether the CFA Zone is an optimum currency area. Section III provides 
some tentative theoretical answers. 
Table 32 Operations account (CO) and debt (DBT) in UMOA (CFAF million) 
Year CO Benin DBT Benin CO Burkina-Faso DBT Burkina-Faso CO Cote d'lvoire DBT Cote d'lvoire 
1980 -4189.200 57299.14 10676.60 63341.74 -96488.50 918856.7 
1981 14814.50 98855.38 15277.90 83448.29 -168591.4 1194253 
1982 -952.8000 183660.1 12053.60 114027.7 -184086.4 1625962 
1983 -15879.90 234275.7 23454.50 151814.3 -241501.9 1838233 
1984 -19557.70 313038.2 44666.70 205240.1 -179044.6 3193741 
1985 -23521.30 367494.7 46912.40 243029.7 -65358.10 4400053 
1986 -23617.60 326560.9 69818.60 232713.6 -85987.20 3885486 
1987 -33077.20 317069.7 80946.30 260267.6 -156522.6 4089749 
Year CO Niger DBT Niger CO Senegal DBT Senegal CO Togo DBT Togo 
1980 21476.6 84258.46 -28189.20 189095.6 13938.20 195117.1 
1981 25185.60 164415.1 -59660.20 262219.5 40828.20 233497.6 
1982 5621.900 197396.0 -65002.40 371329.3 53243.30 270577.5 
1983 15313.30 240448.9 -78835.70 570065.8 73370.40 306867.6 
1984 36694.50 401784.7 -52642.20 853164.4 96122.30 386338.2 
1985 47473.90 542706.1 -93239.30 1082267. 111682.6 432637.4 
1986 56957.00 501096.1 -51852.50 1040631. 106879.7 368809.5 
1987 62783.90 509715.8 -48972.90 1115304. 94517.90 371166.9 
Table 32 cont... 
Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* 
Year Benin Burkina-Faso Cote d'lvoire Niger Senegal Togo 
1980 -1367.782 593.2763 -952.296 392.3200 -670.8087 1399.873 
1981 667.2880 546.2026 -708.371 652.4169 -439.5217 571.9028 
1982 -19275.83 946.0054 -883.2602 3511.197 -571.2548 508.1907 
1983 -1475.297 647.2715 -761.1671 1570.197 -723.1061 418.1444 
1984 -1600.588 459.4924 -1783.768 1094.945 -1620.685 401.9236 
1985 -1562.391 518.0927 -6732.223 1143.167 -1160.741 387.3812 
1986 -1382.702 333.3117 -4518.679 879.7797 -2006.906 345.0697 
1987 -958.5748 321.5312 -2612.881 811.8575 -2277.390 392.6948 
Note: *Ratio of debt (DBT) to operations account (CO). 
Source: Computed by the authors. 
Table 33 Operations account (CO) and debt (DBT) in BEAC (CFAF million) 
Year CO Cameroon DBT Cameroon CO Congo DBT Congo CO Gabon DBT Gabon 
1980 38079.00 NA 19153.00 239169.0 22424.00 286495.7 
1981 17320.00 NA 33961.00 346184.0 54782.00 283414.4 
1982 10502.00 118628.2 10449.00 498501.3 104352.0 285890.7 
1983 60162.00 202342.9 974.00 566636.2 74410.00 277792.8 
1984 20461.00 758344.1 -23676.00 976605.6 92271.00 309804.6 
1985 47114.00 1320824. -17033.00 1340143. 71290.00 541358.3 
1986 12569.00 1284773. -27423.00 1306936. 33588.00 684288.8 
1987 -118825.0 1213881. -18804.00 1540268. -16462.00 766076.5 
Year CO CAR DBT CAR CO Chad DBT Chad 
1980 12403.00 31163.80 -7155.000 42699.69 
1981 19823.00 52090.64 -1218.000 47824.48 
1982 14913.00 69763.90 2002.000 45873.96 
1983 18273.00 81927.90 9126.00 49118.63 
1984 23920.00 100238.6 20641.00 68122.06 
1985 17863.00 156342.5 10742.00 82214.58 
1986 20345.00 162414.7 5281.000 81380.50 
1987 18943.00 188739.1 14523.00 95571.73 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE FRANC ZONE 
Table 33 cont... 
65 
Year Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* 
Cameroon Congo Gabon CAR Chad 
1980 NA 1248,729 1277.630 251.2602 -596.7811 
1981 NA 1019.357 517.3495 262.7788 -3926.476 
1982 1129.577 4770.804 273.9676 467.8059 2291.407 
1983 336.3301 58176.20 373.3273 448.3550 538.2274 
1984 3706.291 -4124.876 335.7551 419.0577 330.0328 
1985 2803.464 -7867.921 759.3648 875.2309 765.3563 
1986 10221.76 -4765.839 2037.302 798.3028 1541.005 
1987 -1021.570 -9191.172 -4653.606 996.3527 658.0715 
Note: *Ratio of debt (DBT) to operations account (CO). 
Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 34 Correlation coefficients between debt 
and the operations account in UMOA by country 
Source: computed by the authors. 
Table 35 Correlation coefficients between debt 






Source: computed by the authors. 
Ill Is the Franc Zone an optimum currency 
area? 
Two main features characterize a monetary integration system. First, exchange 
rates in the integrated area must have a permanent fixed relationship to each 
other, although they may vary jointly with respect to other currencies. Second, 
full convertibility must exist in the sense that there are no exchange controls 
on either current or capital transactions within the area. For these two features 
to be satisfied, two other requirements are necessary: 
• The use of monetary policy must cover the community as a whole. Such 
policy must be carried out solely by the monetary authority. Hence, member 
states have no autonomy in monetary policy. This implies that any 
member's budget deficit will be financed in the capital market. 
• Any change in the rate of exchange between an external currency and the 
currencies of the union must be uniform, as is the case in the FZ. 
Consequently, the responsibility for exchange rate policy, with other currencies 
and for the balance of payments of the union community with the rest of the 
world, must also be assigned to the community and its monetary authority 
must control the pool of exchange reserves. There would exist within the union 
a single currency even if differently denominated currencies co-existed, as in 
the Belgo-Luxembourg case. Whether such union is desirable is a question 
which naturally arises. This leads directly to the problems related to the theory 
of optimum currency areas, to which we now turn. 
Mundell's analysis of optimum currency area theory 
Mundell's initial (1961) contribution to this theory considered the costs and 
benefits of common currencies, and consequently the relative desirability of 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates. 
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An optimum currency area is an area composed of several countries which has 
a single currency regime, or a fixed exchange rate system with guaranteed 
convertibility of currencies. In the ideal case, optimality is achieved by three 
objectives: 
1. The maintenance of low unemployment; 
2. The maintenance of balanced international payments; 
3. The maintenance of a stable international average price level, following 
from the flexible exchange rate. 
These objectives often conflict, which makes optimality both complex and 
difficult to quantify precisely. 
The optimal monetary area assumes perfect factor mobility within the area, 
co-ordinated economic policies, and a central monetary authority in order to 
achieve an equalization of interest rates within the area. Between the zones, 
factors of production are assumed immobile. 
In the case of countries each having their own currency, as in the EEC, 
monetary unification must be achieved progressively through a system of fixed 
exchange rates between national currencies before the creation of a unique 
currency. 
Mundell's initial model for the theory of optimum currency area is 
summarised in Table 36. Consider two regions, A and B, at an initial 
equilibrium state. Suppose an external shock or disturbance occurs in the 
presence of nominal rigidities (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963). Mundell 
argued that if factors of production are downwardly immobile, rigidity of 
nominal prices would in general make exchange rate flexibility preferable. 
Hence, an external shock, such as a shift in demand, will cause a 
disequilibrium in the goods and in the labour markets if prices and/or wages 
are rigid. 
Implications of optimum currency area theory 
Since Region A and Region B have different national currencies, the 
adjustment process resulting from the shock will depend .upon the exchange 
rate system that exists between the two countries. Under a flexible exchange 
rate regime, a depreciation of Region B's currency, relative to Region A will 
make Region B's goods more competitive and ease its unemployment. As 
Region B's goods are demanded, demand for Region A's will fall, and 
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inflation will decrease. Under a fixed exchange rate, as in the FZ, the entire 
burden of the adjustment process, a reduction in real income, output and 
employment, will be borne by Region B if Region A succeeds in preventing 
a rise in prices through maintaining competitiveness. 
Table 36 Mundell's model of the theory of optimum currency areas 
Region B Region A 
1. Initial state of equilibrium 
(internal and external). 
Initial state of equilibrium 
(internal and external). 
2. An exogenous shock occurs: 
demand shifts from goods from 
Region B to those of Region A. 
An exogenous shock occurs. 
3. Region B has its own currency. Region A has its own currency. 
4. A shift away from Region B causes 
demand to fall, ceteris paribus. 
Demand in Region A will increase. 
5. Fewer workers are used in Region B 
as a result of reduced demand. If 
there is factor immobility, this implies 
high unemployment. 
Demand increases, leading to 
inflationary pressures in Region A. 
There is a surplus in the balance of 
payments. 
If we contrast this with the scenario where Regions A and B do not correspond 
with natural boundaries, exchange rate tools cannot be used. As a result of the 
demand shift towards Region A's good, a paradox will emerge that if the 
monetary authorities attempt to reduce unemployment in B, inflation will 
increase in the prosperous Region A, by increasing demand for Region A's 
goods in Region B. If inflation is controlled in Region A by restrictive 
monetary policies, unemployment will increase in Region B. Mundell (1961, 
p.658) defines this situation as 'areas within each of which there is factor 
mobility, but between which there is factor immobility'. Hence the objectives: 
... of price stability and full employment are compatible if, and only if, 
each region has its own currency and can use its exchange rate to 
offset demand shifts or, alternatively, factors are mobile between 
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regions in an optimum currency area, but immobile among currency 
areas. (Bhatia, 1985, p.2) 
The optimum currency area has both advantages and disadvantages. According 
to some economists, monetary integration is a dynamic and evolutionary 
process. Membership of a monetary union cannot be purely assessed against 
the objectives of price stability, full employment and balance of payments 
equilibrium. Other non-quantifiable elements need to be considered. 
Advantages of an optimum currency area 
Four advantages are usually cited in the literature. 
1. As a universal medium of payment, a common currency lowers transaction 
costs between currencies. The larger the area where the common currency 
is used, the better the common currency satisfies its functions as a medium 
of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. The common currency 
allows economies of scale, and leads to relative economic efficiency by 
integration. 
2. The monetary area eliminates speculative capital movements between 
nations. Indeed, exchange rate variation between a monetary area and the 
rest of the world would become less important and less frequent. 
3. Member countries would realize savings of exchange reserves in the context 
of intra-regional trade on the one hand, and vis-a-vis other countries, if 
reserve needs are mutually satisfied and if reserves are pooled, on the other. 
4. Monetary integration could also lead to accelerated fiscal integration, but 
this seems rather difficult to achieve. 
Disadvantages of an optimum currency area 
There are three major drawbacks to the welfare effects of a monetary union. 
1. The most important and sensitive disadvantage is the reduction of national 
monetary sovereignty. A given country cannot use independent monetary 
policy to affect the levels of inflation and employment. Hence, if 
development levels differ between countries, the least developed will still 
continue to suffer from unemployment and economic depression, while the 
most advanced will suffer from inflation. Fiscal policies prove powerless to 
tackle unemployment. 
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2. If the level of development differs among member states, as is likely, the 
optimum currency area could put the economy on a higher Phillips curve. 
This is so because the optimum currency zone could worsen inflation in the 
most advanced countries, or those with surplus economies, and worsen 
unemployment in deficit economies. 
3. A result of the first two disadvantages is a possible deterioration of the least 
developed economies, because of the capital accumulation in the more 
advanced countries. 
Criticisms of Mundell's theory of the optimum currency area 
Mundell's work on the optimum currency zone has been criticized on several 
grounds. First, his definition of an optimum currency area is based on the 
hypothesis of factor mobility. But as Fleming (1971) pointed out, capital 
mobility does not always lead to equilibrium. Indeed, Fleming distinguishes 
labour mobility from capital mobility. For him, capital mobility as a condition 
of monetary unification depended on three factors: the nature of the 
disequilibrium, the sensibility of investment to economic activity, and the 
period of adjustment of the balance of payments. Following a shift in the 
demand from one country to another, under a fixed exchange rate, the 
incentives to invest decline in the first set of countries, and increase in the 
second. In addition, if the incentives to invest decline faster than those of 
savings in the first set of countries, and are greater in the second set, the 
outcome would be the aggravation of under-employment in the first set of 
countries, and a worsening of inflation in the second. Hence capital mobility 
would worsen internal disequilibrium. 
Second, others, including Ishiyama (1975) and Scitovsky (1967) are not 
convinced that labour mobility is a balance-of-payments adjustment 
mechanism. Even if labour mobility does prevail, there are economic and 
physical moving costs that make labour a quasi-fixed factor (Oi, 1962), even 
within a currency area. Ishiyama (1975, p.349) wrote: 
Labour mobility is an inadequate substitute for more conventional 
payments adjustments, demand management and exchange rate 
variation. 
Third, authors such as McKinnon (1963), believe that other criteria should also 
be considered for an optimum currency area. McKinnon specifically suggested 
that the degree of openness should be a criterion for optimality. He defined 
economic openness in terms of the proportion of production of tradables out 
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of the total production of the economy. In a largely open economy, a system 
of flexible exchange rates between those of the currency area and the rest of 
the world is incompatible with internal price stability. Two cases can be 
considered, the case where there is an elastic foreign supply of, and demand 
for, goods, and the case of an absence of monetary direction. 
In the first case, when an open economy manipulates the external value of 
its currency to adjust the balance-of-payment imbalance following a shift in 
demand, the result will be a price variation greater than in a relatively closed 
economy. If governments pursue the objective of price stability in a larger 
open economy at full employment, a reduction of internal demand is required 
to improve the balance of payments, and accordingly, a substantial increase in 
internal taxes becomes necessary. McKinnon concluded that a flexible 
exchange rate is inefficient in correcting the balance of payments in a largely 
open economy. In the second case, McKinnon claims that the economic agents 
will refuse any variation in their wages linked to a price index that does not 
incorporate the unit value of imports, especially in an economy with a large 
share of imports in total consumption. The income effects of exchange rate 
variation will become evident to the agents. 
However, McKinnon's model also revealed some weaknesses, as pointed 
out by Corden (1973). According to Corden, Mundell's theory is based upon 
two hypotheses, changes in the microeconomic conditions of supply and 
demand requiring balance-of-payments adjustment, and price stability in the 
rest of the world. Hence, if balance of payments disequilibrium stemmed from 
macroeconomic distortions, Corden posits that flexible exchange rates are 
necessary to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
A further criterion for achieving an optimum currency area has been the 
diversification of production, as outlined by Kenen (1969). According to 
Kenen, a country with a diversified economy would be more resistant to 
external shocks that a less diversified one. Such a country could use the fixed 
exchange rates to adjust its balance of payments. Flexible rates are necessary 
for less diversified economies. Hence, small countries with less diversified 
economies do not constitute optimum monetary areas. 
There appears to be a contradiction between Kenen's and McKinnon's 
conclusions. For McKinnon, the more diversified the economy, the smaller its 
foreign sector. If this country uses fixed rates, as suggested by Kenen, fiscal 
and monetary policies must be used to correct for external disequilibrium. 
Ingram (1969) adds the criterion of the degree of financial integration to the 
conditions of optimum currency areas. Ingram claims that the size of the 
optimum monetary zone must be determined by the financial characteristics of 
the economy. This differs from the analysis made by Mundell, McKinnon and 
Kenen, which emphasized the real aspects of the ecofiomy. Ingram employed 
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a high degree of international financial integration for both short and long-term 
securities as a criterion for an optimum currency area. Fleming (1971) stressed 
that capital mobility is dependent upon many factors, as reviewed under 
Mundell's model. Moreover, surplus economies would not be willing to lend 
indefinitely to those in deficit. Hence, one must distinguish between financing 
a deficit to correct for payments disequilibrium, and to finance such 
disequilibrium. 
Similarly, the rate of inflation is a further criterion to be considered. This, 
has been put forward by Haberler (1970) and Fleming (1971). According to 
these authors, balance-of-payments disequilibrium is due to divergent evolution 
of inflation rates. This is an important point since Britain is making a 
levelling-off of inflation rates within the EEC a condition for entering the 
EMS. 
Finally, Haberler (1970), Ingram (1969), and Tower and Willett (1970) 
stress that it is not so much economic characteristics as the similarity of policy 
attitudes of member countries that is relevant in making a group of countries 
a successful currency area, although they were vague about the content of 
'policy integration'. Tower and Willett (1970, p.411) write: 
Perhaps of primary importance for a successful currency area with a 
less than perfect internal adjustment mechanism is that there be a 
reasonable degree of compatibility between the member countries' 
attributes toward growth of inflation and unemployment and their 
abilities to trade off between these objectives. A nation with a low 
tolerance for unemployment... and price pressures from concentrated 
industries, would make a poor partner for a country with a low 
tolerance of inflation and high productivity growth, making for a very 
favourable 'Phillips Curve'. 
This policy integration criterion is similar in approach to the inflation rate 
criterion, but it involves diverse elements, and it not very homogenous. 
Theory and the Franc Zone 
How do these theories apply to CFA countries? In the Franc Zone there exists 
a unique currency, one of the key criteria of an optimum currency area. 
However, other criteria do not seem to be satisfied. 
First, all the economies of the Zone are far from achieving full employment. 
In fact, they are experiencing high and worsening unemployment, resulting 
from various structural adjustment programmes. Second, relative price stability 
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and low inflation prevail in the Zone, but price stability is due to stringent 
discipline from the FZ rather than to a flexible exchange rate. Third, while 
labour mobility does exist between the two zones, such mobility is far from 
perfect. In fact, labour mobility is not solely motivated by economic incentives, 
but also by social ties among ethnic groups across artificial borders inherited 
from colonization. 
Finally, regarding the openness of the economy as defined by McKinnon, 
who uses the proportion of tradables out of the total production of the 
economy, one can say that in most of these mono (or two) crop economies 
such proportions are low. Accordingly, the Franc Zone does not appear to fulfil 
the main criteria of an optimal currency area, despite the uniqueness of its 
currency. 
Despite immediately non-quantifiable benefits such as monetary stability 
and greater disposition to regional integration, CFA countries do not derive 
total net gains overall from membership of the Zone. Moreover, following the 
December 1991 Maastricht accord, the issue of a single European currency has 
emerged. It is highly likely that European national currencies, including the 
French franc, will no longer exist. However, according to French officials, the 
disappearance of the French franc does not imply the end of the FZ. The 
problem remains to assess how the Zone will adjust to the new environment. 
It is therefore timely to search for alternative scenarios for the CFA franc. 
This is the object of Phase II of this research. 
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